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Challenging the Commodification of 
Human Rights: 
The Case of the Right to Housing 
By David Birchall* 
The profitability of commodified housing is driving extreme levels of 
corporate investment. To boost profits investors are exploiting “undervalued” 
low-income housing, evicting vulnerable individuals, hoarding land and charging 
exploitative fees. This is causing severe harm to individuals’ right to housing 
across the globe, including, inter alia, rapidly increasing prices and debt, 
increasing evictions, homelessness, and increased recourse to substandard 
accommodation. The harm is endemic, but the human rights response has been 
tepid.  
This paper argues that both state obligations and the content of the right to 
housing under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) can usefully address the problem. However, in communications with 
State Parties the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
addresses issues of commodification and affordability in vague terms that fail to 
generate meaningful obligations. The paper grounds the CESCR’s approach in 
theories of enforceability which argue that enforcement is more practicable when 
“clear violations” can be established. The CESCR offers clear statements of breach 
only when identifying explicitly wrongful practices, such as discriminatory laws. 
This approach, however, almost entirely occludes harm caused by the 
marketization of human rights. It skeletonizes the “protect” limb of state 
obligations, permits the long-term retrogression of affordability and enables the 
serious subsequent effects. The paper proposes that “clear violations” can be 
constructed from the results of, and laws constituting, harmful marketization. A 
three-stage process of identification of breach, standard-setting, and policy 
suggestions is recommended that can turn the long-term retrogression of access to 
housing into specific, measurable statements of violations and recommendations. 
This same approach is advocated for business responsibilities under the UN 
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Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, with the content of these 
responsibilities also evaluated.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the right to housing in light of its entrenched and evolving 
commodification. Recent discussions have highlighted increasing respect for socio-
economic rights, their increasing justiciability and their increasingly prominent role 
in rights discourse.1 Yet concurrently, the materialities of socio-economic rights are 
increasingly commodified and treated as assets.2 This applies particularly to 
housing.3 Estimates of the value of global real estate range from 21% to 60% of 
total global assets.4 House prices have risen by more than 50% in many places 
including Hong Kong, London, Sydney since 2011.5 One major investor, the 
Blackstone Group L.P. (Blackstone), which owns hundreds of thousands of rental 
properties in the US alone,6 made profits of $3.5 billion in 2018,7 and is accused of 
targeting low-income tenants through, inter alia, significantly increased rental 
prices, fee-charging and evictions.8 This contributes to serious and accelerating 
problems of homelessness, precarious tenancy, housing-related debt, substandard 
habitability, evictions, and the exclusion of the poor in many of the world’s 
wealthiest cities.9 To take one example, investors in Dublin, Ireland, are accused of 
a range of policies detrimental to the right to housing including “land hoarding”10, 
 
1 Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS 3, 4 (2008); 
Philip Alston, (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Second Rep. on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, ¶¶4-5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/31, (Apr. 28, 2016) 
[hereinafter UNSR, Economic and Social Rights]; Michael Ramsden, Judging Socio-economic 
Rights in Hong Kong, 16.2 INT. J. CONST. LAW 447, 447 (2018). 
2 Karen Bakker, The “Commons” Versus the “Commodity”: Alter‐globalization, Anti‐
privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South, 39.3 ANTIPODE 430 (2007); 
Aoife Nolan, Privatization and Economic and Social Rights, 40.4 HUM. RTS. Q. 815 (2018) 
[hereinafter Nolan, Privatization]. 
3 See MANUEL AALBERS, THE FINANCIALIZATION OF HOUSING: A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
APPROACH (2016). 
4 U.N. Environment Programme, The Value of Everything, 4, 9 (2015); Leilani Farha (Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing), Report on the Financialization of Housing and the Right to 
Adequate Housing, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/51, (Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter UNSR, 
Financialization]. 
5 Id. ¶ 26. 
6 Mandates of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a 
Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
discrimination in this Context, Letter to the Blackstone Group, 2, 2-3 OL OTH 17/2019 (Mar. 22, 
2019) [hereinafter Blackstone Letter]. 
7 Blackstone Reports First Quarter 2019 Results and Announces Conversion to Corporation, 
BLACKSTONE (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://s1.q4cdn.com/641657634/files/doc_financials/2019/q1/Blackstone1Q19EarningsPressRele
ase.pdf. 
8 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
9 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶¶ 34-38 nn.36-44. 
10 Mandates of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a 
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the restriction of supply to increase value. “Dublin rents have increased by 42% in 
the past six years.”11 On average individuals must “allocate 86.3% of their earnings 
[to] rent.”12  Adult homelessness rose “by nearly 95.9% between 2015 and 2018… 
child homelessness grew by 227.7% over the same period.”13 Core elements of the 
right to housing are retrogressing in the name of private profit, not just in Ireland 
but across the developed world.14 
This paper studies the empirical situation within housing markets, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) treatment of the 
problem, and the applicability of both the doctrinal tenants of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) to the problem. 15 Sixteen sets 
of Concluding Observations to State Parties by the CESCR are used to map the 
CESCR’s approach to rights enforcement, covering 2015-2019.16 It draws also 
from work by UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing, Leilani Farha.17 The 
UK and Hong Kong are used as more detailed case studies. The USA – which has 
not ratified the ICESCR - is the case study related to business responsibilities under 
the UNGPs. The UNGPs apply “to all business enterprises… wherever they 
operate.”18 Therefore despite the non-ratification of the ICESCR by the US, 
 
Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
discrimination in this Context, Letter to Ireland, 1, 2 OL IRL 2/2019 (Mar. 22, 2019) [hereinafter 
Ireland Letter]. 
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 3. 
14 See UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4. 
15 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]; Comm. on 
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 24 (2017) on State Obligations Under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business 
Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter General Comment 24, 
Business]. 
16 Concluding Observations follow “the review of a state party report [and contain the treaty 
body’s] collective assessment of the State's record and recommendations for enhanced 
implementation”. See UNHCR, Concluding Observations, 
https://www.refworld.org/type/CONCOBSERVATIONS.html (last visited July 26, 2019). 
17 See UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4; see also Ireland Letter, supra note 10; Mandates of 
the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination in this Context, 
Letter to the Czech Republic, OL CZE 2/2019 (Mar. 22, 2019) [Czech Republic Letter]; Letter to 
Denmark, OL DNK 2/2019 (Mar. 22, 2019) [Denmark Letter]; Letter to Spain, OL ESO 3/2019 
(Mar. 22, 2019) [Spain Letter]; Letter to Sweden, OL SWE 1/2019 (Mar. 22, 2019) [Sweden 
Letter]; Letter to the United State of America, OL USA 2/2019 (Mar. 22, 2019) [US Letter]; 
Blackstone Letter, supra note 6. 
18 Guiding Principles, supra note 15, §§ 1, 11. 
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companies hold a “responsibility to respect”19 the ICESCR, which includes the 
right to housing,20 in the US. 
The content of the right to housing and of state obligations under article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR provide tools to address the harm caused by marketization. Yet the 
principles are not applied clearly or forcefully in Concluding Observations. In 
numerous recent Concluding Observations, the CESCR discusses severe 
affordability problems and links them to failures of market regulation but does not 
establish concrete obligations upon states to alter policy. For example, it 
recommends that Hong Kong takes a “human rights approach” to its housing 
policies, with no detail as to what this entails.21 This neither assists state parties in 
meeting their obligations, nor sets standards against which future performance can 
be evaluated.22 The result is recommendations that are easy to ignore, and that allow 
systemic problems in housing markets to fester. 
The CESCR’s rationale appears to derive from Chapman’s “violations 
approach”, and Roth’s similar notion of “clear violations”.23 Where “violation, 
victim, and remedy” are easily visible,24 the CESCR sets clear recommendations 
against which state parties can be evaluated. Examples given below include overtly 
discriminatory laws, which the CESCR regularly labels as direct breaches of treaty 
obligations. The problem regarding marketization is that profit-seeking companies, 
and the laws that enable them, rarely produce such clear violations. Rather, 
affordability retrogresses, causing subsequent effects such as rising evictions and 
homelessness, but without creating a moment of clear violation. This paper 
proposes that clear violations can be constructed from commodified housing. A 
three-stage process of problem identification, standard setting, and policy 
recommendations through which the state could meet this standard is advocated. 
As noted, Dublin has an 86.3% income-housing costs ratio, meaning that the 
average Dubliner spends 86.3% of their income on housing. This is far beyond any 
national standard. Both the US and Canada use a 30 per cent ratio as the limit of 
 
19 Guiding Principles, supra note 15, § 11. 
20 Guiding Principles, supra note 15, § 12. 
21 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic 
Rep. of China, including H.K., China, and Mac., China, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CHN/CO/2 (June 
13, 2014) [hereinafter CESCR, CO Hong Kong]. 
22 Id. These are reviewed systemically below.  
23 Audrey Chapman, A Violations Approach for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 23 (1996) [hereinafter Chapman, 
Violations]; Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues 
Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004) [hereinafter 
Roth, Defending]. 
24 Roth, Defending, supra note 23, at 69. 
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affordable housing,25 and an OECD paper used a 40 per cent ratio.26 The Dublin 
figure should therefore be identified as a breach of the state obligation to ensure 
affordable housing for all, which is one of the seven core criteria of the right to 
housing.27 Next, a reasonable but ambitious quantitative reduction in this costs ratio 
should be established as an obligation to progressively realize the right to housing 
within the next reporting window. Finally, policies should be suggested as pro tanto 
obligations to meet this objective, such as rent control laws. This would create 
concrete statements of breach and objectives against which future state 
performance could be judged, including specific policy recommendations with 
which the state would have to comply or at least explain its reasons for non-
compliance. This would turn affordability into an obligation capable of clear 
violation or compliance. Business responsibilities under the UNGPs are analysed 
similarly.  
The paper begins by discussing the commodification of housing, its history 
and precursors, statistics, methods and effects on specific countries. It then 
discusses obligations relating to the right to housing and regarding the duty to 
protect in relation to business activities. It then analyses Concluding Observations, 
noting that market regulation is almost universally addressed but only in vague 
terms. To understand this problem the notion of “clear violations” is used. The 
paper then discusses how “clear violations” can be constructed from commodified 
housing. Finally, the same analysis is undertaken regarding business 
responsibilities under the UNGPs.  
I. THE COMMODIFICATION OF HOUSING 
A. A Brief History 
Since the Second World War, housing in many developed states has been 
defined by three broad eras. First, the era of social housing, predating the binding 
human right to housing but in which the state took universal housing as a core 
obligation of decent societies. Second, the era of “housing finance”, starting in the 
late 1970s, of governments turning away from direct provision and toward 
assistance to individuals to buy homes from private developers. Third, the 
 
25 About Affordable Housing in Canada, CAN. MORTG. AND HOUS. CORP. (Mar. 31, 2018), 
https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/developing-and-renovating/develop-new-affordable-
housing/programs-and-information/about-affordable-housing-in-canada [hereinafter Canada, 
Affordable]; Defining Affordable Housing, THE U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-featd-article-081417.html (last visited July 26, 
2019) [hereinafter HUD, Affordable]. 
26 ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., HOUSING COSTS OVER INCOME 1 (2019), 
https://www.oecd.org/els/family/HC1-2-Housing-costs-over-income.pdf. 
27 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Gen. Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), ¶ 8(c), E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991) [hereinafter CESCR, General 
Comment 4, Housing]. 
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contemporary and still accelerating era of “financialization”, in which investment 
companies enter markets and trade properties at significant scale as securitized 
assets, and some, like Blackstone, become landlords at a global scale.28 
In the UK, 5.5 million homes were constructed by the state between 1946 
and 1980.29 The same trend was even more powerful in planned socialist 
economies, which rapidly constructed housing to meet growing populations.30 This 
trend began with Lloyd George’s call in 1919 for “Homes for Heroes” and 
increased after World War Two. The Board of Trade in a 1946 letter to Aneurin 
Bevan, then Minister of Health, urged the prioritization of housing.31 Problems with 
Keynesian policy in the west and socialist policy in the east led, from the late-1970s 
onward, to a monetarist approach to economic policy, and a greater role for the 
private sector in housing.32 The state was to be seen primarily as a facilitator of 
private capital, particularly in the US under Reagan, and the UK under Thatcher. 
The principle of politics became to facilitate the economy.33  
This led to the era of “housing finance,”34 which refers to the state meeting 
its obligations toward the right to housing through “financial policies and 
programmes that aim to finance the cost of housing for individuals and families by 
providing loans (mortgages or micro-loans) or grants (subsidies or tax exemptions) 
for the purchase, rental construction or improvement of housing units.”35 This era 
in retrospect appears as an interregnum between the eras of social housing and 
today’s financialized housing. The state switched from supply-side to demand-side 
policies, opening up markets but actively supporting entry into those markets. The 
theory stated that it was more efficient to allow the private sector to develop homes, 
 
28 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 4. 
29 MICHAEL HARLOE, THE PEOPLE'S HOME?: SOCIAL RENTED HOUSING IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 
(John Wiley & Sons eds., Blackwell Publishers, 1995). 
30  Raquel Rolnik & Lidia Rabinovich, Late-Neoliberalism: the Financialization of 
Homeownership and the Housing Rights of the Poor, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 57, 59 (Aoife Nolan ed., Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
[hereinafter Rolnik & Rabinovich, Housing]. 
31 Letter to Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health, from G.A. Issacs, Bd. of Trade (Mar. 19, 1946), 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/attlees-britain/houses-needed/. 
32 See John Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982). 
33 FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION 174-75 (2009). 
34 Raquel Rolnik (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing), Rep. on Adequate Housing as a 
Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
discrimination in This Context, U.N. Doc. A/67/286 (Aug. 10, 2012) [hereinafter UNSR, 
Finance]. 
35 Rolnik & Rabinovich, Housing, supra note 30, at 60. 
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and the state budget was best devoted to assisting individuals to enter the market.36  
The right to housing was to be actively realized through the market.  
However, within the first-generation housing bubbles developed and 
housing in major urban areas became commodified nest eggs.37 Now, in the era of 
the Washington Consensus, the idea that socio-economic justice was removed from 
the state’s core functions was developing.38 Home ownership was promoted further 
and housing rapidly became a competitive economic sector.39 In London, average 
prices rose by 544 percent between January 1995 and April 2019.40 The Economist 
found that the total value of residential property in 20 developed economies 
increased from $40 trillion to $60 trillion between 2000 and 2003.41 This was partly 
caused by, and greatly encouraged further, private investors into these markets. 
Whereas previously the aim of marketization was to create “a property-owning 
democracy” in which each individual and family owned their own home,42 now 
prices in major cities skyrocketed as some made fortunes.43 It became accepted that 
many key workers and young people would be unable to afford homes in such 
locations.44 Various interventions have been proposed, ranging from, in some parts 
of Ireland, rent control laws,45 to the more targeted efforts of the UK government, 
such as key worker mortgages.46 Nonetheless these interventions at best have 
dampened the acceleration of affordability problems. The most recent trend derives 
investor actions following the sub-prime crisis, and particularly corporations 
 
36 MARTIN J. DAUNTON, A PROPERTY-OWNING DEMOCRACY?: HOUSING IN BRITAIN (1987). 
37 Rolnik & Rabinovich, Housing, supra note 30, at 63.  
38 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 93, 183 (2007). 
39 Stuart Hodkinson & Glyn Robbins, The Return of Class War Conservatism? Housing Under 
the UK Coalition Government, 33 CRIT. SOC. POL’Y. 57, 62 (2013). 
40 House Prices Report for London: January 1995 to July 2020, HOME.CO.UK, 
https://www.home.co.uk/guides/house_prices_report.htm?location=london&all=1 (last visited 
July 26, 2019) [hereinafter Home Prices]. 
41 The Global Housing Boom: In Come the Waves, THE ECONOMIST (June 16, 2005), 
http://www.economist.com/node/4079027. 
42 Martin O'Neill, Liberty, Equality and Property‐Owning Democracy, 40.3 J. SOC. PHIL. 379, 
379 (2009). 
43 For example, most of the Hong Kong’s ten richest individuals made their money on full or in 
large part through real estate. Hong Kong’s 50 Richest People, FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/hong-kong-billionaires/list/#tab:overall (last visited July 26, 2019). 
Foreign investment is also booming in some markets due to high levels of profit and security. The 
inflow of foreign capital into the UK real estate market rose from £1.5 billion ($1.85 billion) to 
£7 billion ($8.64 billion) from 2009-11. See Manuel Aalbers, et al., London and New York as a 
Safe Deposit Box for the Transnational Wealth Elite, 48.12 ENV. AND PLAN. 2443, 2452 (2016) 
[hereinafter Aalbers, Elite]. 
44 See generally Michael Edwards, The Housing Crisis and London, 20.2 CITY 222 (2016). 
45 Ireland Letter, supra note 10, at 3. 
46 Colin Jones, The Credit Crunch: Short-term UK Housing Market Correction or Long-term 
Tipping Point?, 16.1 INT’L J. HOUS. POL’Y 70 (2016). 
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purchasing huge numbers of rental properties. This was covered in a 2017 UNSR 
report, explained next. 
B. The Financialization of Housing 
The first serious treatment of an issue related to the housing market by a 
human rights authority came with Rachel Rolnik’s 2012 report as UNSR on the 
right to housing into housing finance.47 This report almost entirely targeted 
government plans around the privatization of publicly-owned homes, such as, in 
the US, the Housing and Community and Development Act of 1974 which initiated 
privatization through the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 
8.48 This was also noted in 2010 country visit to the USA by the same UNSR.49 The 
UNSR quotes the World Bank’s 1993 advice on the issue: “[g]overnments should 
be encouraged to adopt policies that enable housing markets to work … and avoid 
distorting housing markets.”50 The focus of the report is three major forms of 
governmental strategies to encourage private ownership: mortgage markets;51 
demand subsidies from the government such as a “down-payment subsidy or a 
subsidized loan”;52 and, for the developing world, housing microfinance.53 The 
UNSR also noted in a passage not dissimilar to the 2017 report that: 
[T]he conceptual transformation of adequate housing from a social good into a commodity 
and a strategy for household wealth accumulation and welfare security. Housing has 
become a financial asset (“real estate”), and housing markets are increasingly regulated so 
as to promote the financial aspects rather than the social aspects of housing.54 
Leilani Farha’s report as UNSR in 2017 into the financialization of housing marked 
an evolution in this approach. The UNSR defines financialization in relation to 
human rights as “the way capital investment in housing increasingly disconnects 
housing from its social function of providing a place to live in security and dignity 
and hence undermines the realization of housing as a human right.”55 It thus refers 
to a macro-situation in which “[h]ousing and real estate markets have been 
transformed by corporate finance, including banks, insurance and pension funds, 
hedge funds, private equity firms and other kinds of financial intermediaries”.56  
 
47 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34. 
48 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34, ¶ 5. 
49 Raquel Rolnik (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing), Rep. on Mission to the United 
States of America, ¶10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/20/Add.4 (Feb. 12, 2010). 
50 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34, ¶ 3; Stephen K. Mayo & Shlomo Angel, Housing: Enabling 
Markets to Work, WORLD BANK 6 (1993). 
51 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34, ¶¶ 20-32. 
52 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34, ¶ 33. 
53 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34, ¶¶ 49-61. 
54 UNSR, Finance, supra note 34, ¶ 11. 
55 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
56 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 2. 
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The term captures a range of specific business-related acts, with many 
variations between states based on distinct legal and historical treatments of 
property.57 Two general forms are worth highlighting. First, investors are 
increasingly buying large quantities of rental properties defined as “undervalued”.58 
Often these are foreclosed homes or homes rented by low-income tenants in areas 
experiencing gentrification.59 These homes are then renovated and offered at a 
higher rental rate, “pricing tenants out of their own homes and communities”.60 In 
2017, Blackstone alone spent $10 billion to purchase repossessed properties in the 
United States of America at courthouses and in online auctions following the 2008 
financial crisis, emerging as the largest rental landlord in the country.61 Other 
“major institutional players invested $20 billion to purchase approximately 200,000 
single-family homes in the United States between 2012 and mid-2013,” and there 
was over €541 billion of distressed real estate debt in Europe in 2015 much of it 
held by public asset management companies.62 This business model creates specific 
pressure on lower-income households. In the US, Blackstone subsidiary Invitation 
Homes increased rental rates by 7 per cent on average in the Western US in the 
third quarter of 2017.63 In 2013, in Charlotte, North Carolina, the same company 
“filed eviction proceedings against 10 percent of its renters.”64 Invitation Homes 
has also significantly increased fee charging, such as $95 for late payment of rent, 
increasing revenue by $2 million in so doing.65 Despite these issues, private 
investors are increasingly encouraged into new markets by governments. One such 
means adopted in Ireland is that of “Real Estate Investment Trusts” (REITs) that 
allow for the complete avoidance of corporation tax so long as most profits are 
reinvested.66 A related point is the lack of accountability tenants have as the 
 
57 There are numerous forms that financialization can take often dependent on the legal regime in 
which it operates. A variety are discussed in the US context in Joshua Akers et al., Liquid 
Tenancy: "Post-crisis" Economies of Displacement, Community Organizing, and New Forms of 
Resistance, 1.1 RADICAL HOUS. J. 10 (2019) [hereinafter Akers et al., Tenancy]. 
58 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 27; Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
59 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 37. 
60 Press Release, Human Rights Council, States and Real Estate Private Equity Firms Questioned 
for Compliance with Human Rights, U.N. Press Release HRC (Mar. 26, 2019) [hereinafter HRC, 
Press Release]. 
61 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 27. 
62 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 27; see also Joe Beswick et al., Speculating on 
London’s Housing Future: The Rise of Global Corporate Landlords in ‘Post-Crisis’ Urban 
Landscapes, 20.2 CITY 323 (2016); RIGHT TO THE CITY ALLIANCE, RENTING FROM WALL STREET: 
BLACKSTONE’S INVITATION HOMES IN LOS ANGELES AND RIVERSIDE 9 (2014). 
63 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
64 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
65 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
66 Ireland Letter, supra note 10, at 2. 
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commodity-form of housing creates “nameless” owners67 and “absentee corporate 
landlords.”68 
Second, housing in inflating markets is used as a safe haven investment. 
“Housing and urban real estate have become the commodity of choice for corporate 
finance, a “safety deposit box” for the wealthy, a repository of capital and excess 
liquidity from emerging markets and a convenient place for shell companies to 
stash their money with very little transparency.”69 Investments in housing in major 
cities such as London and New York are seen as near-guaranteed investment 
opportunities, based on long-term trends.70 This contributes significantly to rising 
prices in the least affordable markets that inevitably affect lower-income 
households more severely. A related component of commodification is the 
significant rise in luxury properties often sold to global elites who may visit the 
home only occasionally.71 In Melbourne one-fifth of investor-owned homes were 
empty in 2015.72 Investment visas schemes encourage this form of 
commodification, demonstrating one of many examples of the legal construction of 
financialization.73  
The UNSR states that policy responses have prioritized “support for 
financial institutions” over access to housing.74 She also notes some positive 
developments, such as the autonomous regions of Spain facilitating the temporary 
expropriation of vacant housing and prohibiting foreclosures and evictions that 
would result in homelessness.75 Various states have implemented taxes on foreign 
owners, and Vancouver a new tax on vacant homes.76 Others have introduced taxes 
on luxury property or on property speculation.77 Some governments assist in the 
financing of affordable housing, require developers to provide a proportion of 
affordable housing,78 or provide microfinance options.79 This confirms that options 
are available to states, but the UNSR notes that  states often implement them 
 
67 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 32. 
68 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 33. 
69 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 25. 
70 Aalbers, Elite, supra note 43. 
71 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 30. 
72 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 30; CATHERINE CASHMORE, SPECULATIVE 
VACANCIES 8: THE EMPTY PROPERTIES IGNORED BY STATISTICS 5 (2015), 
https://www.prosper.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/11Final_Speculative-Vacancies-2015-
1.pdf. 
73 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 23; see generally Andrew Lang, The Legal 
Construction of Economic Rationalities?, 40 J. LAW SOC. 155 (2013).  
74 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 67. 
75 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 69. 
76 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 70. 
77 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 71. 
78 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 73. 
79 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 75. 
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inadequately, such as defining “affordable” housing in unrealistic ways.80 The 
UNSR concludes with a series of critiques and recommendations, describing that 
states should “ensure that all investment in housing recognizes its social function”81 
and “human rights implementation [should become] the overriding goal, not a 
subsidiary or neglected obligation.”82  
C. Country Situations 
In understanding the effects of marketization, it is necessary to understand 
the broader empirical situation in states in which financialization has taken hold. 
To this end I will briefly review the situation in the UK, focusing on London, and 
in Hong Kong.  
As noted, London, average house prices in London rose by 544 percent 
between January 1995 and April 2019.83 UK wide, the number of people made 
homeless after failing to pay rent trebled from 2010-2016.84 86,000 properties in 
the UK are owned by anonymous offshore investment companies.85 Londoner’s 
spend on average 70% of their income on rent and bills.86 Around 15% of all new-
build homes in London between 2014 and 2016 were sold to foreign investors, 70% 
of whom planned to rent them out.87 The number of landlords in the UK is a record-
high of 2.5 million, a rise of 26% in five years,88 although the government has 
increased taxes to attempt to reduce this number.89 Housing benefit recipients can 
be forced to relocate to a cheaper region, and essential workers such as nurses 
 
80 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 72. 
81 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 77. 
82 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 77. 
83 Home Prices, supra note 40. 
84 Ben Kentish, Number of Private Renters Made Homeless Has Trebled Since 2010, Figures 
Reveal, THE INDEP. (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/private-
renters-homeless-trebled-2010-rent-conserative-government-david-cameron-theresa-may-london-
a7502511.html. 
85 Sam Leon, Two Years on, We're Still in the Dark About the UK's 86,000 Anonymously Owned 
Homes, GLOBAL WITNESS (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/blog/two-years-
still-dark-about-86000-anonymously-owned-uk-homes/.  
86 Londoners Now Spending 70% of Average Income on Rent and Essential Bills, PORTICO (June 
8, 2016), https://www.portico.com/blog/our-news/londoners-now-spending-70-of-their-income-
on-rent-essential-bills. 
87 Robert Booth, Foreign Investors Snapping Up London Homes Suitable for First-Time Buyers, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jun/13/foreign-
investors-snapping-up-london-homes-suitable-for-first-time-buyers. 
88 Marc Da Silva, Number of UK Landlords Rises to 2.5 million, LANDLORD TODAY (Apr. 9 
2018), https://www.landlordtoday.co.uk/breaking-news/2018/4/number-of-uk-landlords-rises-to-
1-75-million. 
89Emma Agyemang, UK Capital Gains Tax Take Soars as Buy-to-Let Landlords Sell Up, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6945d210-6681-11e9-9adc-
98bf1d35a056. 
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cannot afford to live in London.90 Public-private partnerships price local residents 
out. London’s Haringey Council is completing multiple regenerations deals and 
states of its housing strategy: “The ability of local people to afford the new homes 
being built, is dependent on them… increasing their incomes to a sufficient level to 
afford the new homes.”91 The fire at Grenfell tower, which killed 80 people, 
brought wider safety issues to light that were intrinsically rooted in cost-saving 
measures.92 In 2019, a swathe of low-income people, including both drug addicts 
and single parents, were moved into an out-of-town renovated office block, lacking 
security, privacy, and adequate kitchen facilities and that suffered from high crime 
rates.93 According to 2018 report, 86 per cent of low-income renters experience 
harmful living conditions (i.e. habitability problems) and/or housing-related 
poverty.94 Philip Alston’s report into the UK described that “[i]n England, 
homelessness rose 60 per cent between 2011 and 2017 and rough sleeping rose 165 
per cent from 2010 to 2018. The charity Shelter estimates that 320,000 people in 
Britain are now homeless.”95 
Hong Kong, which suffers more significant practical problems linked to 
space and immigration than does London,96 has been ranked as the world’s least 
affordable housing market for the last nine years by the metric of how long it would 
 
90 Peter Byrne, Housing Costs 'to Drive 40% of Nurses Out of London, BBC (Apr. 24, 2019), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-36151927. 
91Aditya Chakrabortty, How Power Operates in Modern Britain: With Absolute Contempt, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 3, 2017),  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/03/britain-power-contempt-grenfell-
labour-haringey-social-housing. 
92 Vikram Dodd, Grenfell Tower Death Toll Will Remain at About 80, Police Believe, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/10/grenfell-tower-
fire-death-toll-will-remain-at-about-80-police-believe. 
93 Matt Precey et al., Inside Harlow's Office Block 'Human Warehouse' Housing, BBC (Apr. 2, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-essex-47720887. 
94 David Rhodes & Julie Rugg, Vulnerability Amongst Low-Income Households in the Private 
Rented Sector in England, UNIV. OF YORK CENTRE FOR HOUS. POL’Y 45 (2018), 
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/news-and-events/pressreleases/2018/vulnerability-report.pdf. 
95 Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Righs), Rep. on the Mission 
to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/41/39/Add.1 (Apr. 23, 2019). 
96 Naomi Ng & Ng Kang-chung, Number of Mainland Chinese Migrants Coming to Hong Kong 
Drops by Almost 15,000 From Last Year, Government Data Shows, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/community/article/2159723/number-mainland-chinese-migrants-coming-hong-kong-drops 
(mainland immigration from 1997-2016 amounted to 950,000 individuals and 12.8% of Hong 
Kong’s total population); H.K. Population (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/population.pdf?utm_source=weibolife.apps
pot.com. 
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take someone earning the median average wage to afford a house.97The researchers, 
Demographia, categorise Hong Kong as “severely unaffordable.”98 The 2016 
census revealed that 209,700 people live in bed-space only sub-divided apartments 
or roof-top slums.99 These frequently lack basic amenities, safety, hygiene and 
security features.100 As these are private sector, rents vary, but there is no control 
and they are often far above public housing rates despite habitability issues. The 
median price for a bed-space only apartment in 2017 was HK$4200 (US$537).101 
These feature shared facilities, and as in the case study described in this article, an 
unsanitary combined kitchen/toilet.102 Public rental housing costs around 
HK$2,500 and would be much larger.103 Hong Kong is the 17th richest region in the 
world by GDP per capita, and in top ten on a purchasing power parity basis.104 Hong 
Kong’s approach to housing, explained further below, is characterized by an 
extremely liberal approach to the private sector buttressed by significant investment 
in public housing and subsidies. Lee et al. state that ”the financialization of Hong 
Kong depends mainly on real estate.”105 A major revenue source for the government 
is selling land to private developers, averaging around 100 billion HKD per year.106 
This is sold with minimal caveats, in part because the land prices are so high that 
developers need to extract maximum value to make a profit.107 Hong Kong is seeing 
 
97 Pearl Liu, Hong Kong Tops the Table as World’s Most Expensive Housing Market for 9th 
Straight Year, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2182980/nothing-be-proud-hong-kong-tops-table-worlds-
most-expensive-housing-market. 
98 Id.  
99 Kris Cheng, 209,700 People Live in Subdivided Flats in Hong Kong, 2016 Gov’t By-Census 
Reveals, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/01/19/209700-people-live-subdivided-flats-hong-kong-2016-
govt-census-reveals/. 
100 Luke Marsh, The Strategic Use of Human Rights Treaties in Hong Kong’s Cage-Home Crisis: 
No Way Out?, 3.1 ASN. J. LAW SOC. 159 (2016), 164-7 [hereinafter Marsh, Cage-Home]. 
101 Naomi Ng, Coffin Cubicles, Caged Homes and Subdivisions … Life Inside Hong Kong’s Grim 
Low Income Housing, SCMP, (Sept. 26, 2016) https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/education-community/article/2022430/theyre-just-us-exhibition-shines-light-hong-kongs. 
102 Id. 
103 David Vetter, How Hong Kong’s Public Housing System Works: Costs, Waiting Times and 
Sales, SCMP (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/society/article/2182106/why-public-housing-shortfall-will-remain-thorn-hong-kongs.  
104 STATISTICS TIMES, Projected GDP per capita Ranking (2019-2023) (Apr. 8, 2019), 
http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-capita-ranking.php.  
105 Kim Ming Lee et al., Financialization and Economic Inequality in Hong Kong: The Cost of 
the Finance-led Growth Regime in Hong Kong 20 Years after the Handover. Studies in the 
Political Economy of Public Policy, 127, 136 (Brian Fong & Tai-Lok Lui eds., Palgrave 
Macmillian) (2018). 
106 Peggy Sito & Sandy Li, How Hong Kong Land Policies Help Fuel City’s Ever-rising Property 
Prices, SCMP (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/property/hong-kong-
china/article/2125469/hong-kongs-politics-deter-options-alter-land-sales-policy.  
107 Id. 
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an increase in charitable housing, where rents are set at no more than 25 per cent of 
tenants’ household income.108 This is a positive development but the cost pressures 
are too severe to be considered a solution to the problem.  
II. OBLIGATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS UNDER THE ICESCR 
Two truths appear evident: first, affordability of housing is retrogressing in 
many, particularly wealthy, states, with consequences for many other elements of 
the right to housing and two, private investors are contributing to this retrogression. 
The core question therefore is that of whether profit-motivated retrogressions of 
rights by corporate actors are coherent with human rights standards, and if not, how 
they should be addressed by states and human rights bodies. In this section I provide 
a review of the relevant obligations under the ICESCR as interpreted by the 
CESCR, and a review of recent Concluding Observations in developed states with 
well-developed private housing markets to understand how the CESCR is 
addressing the topic. 
A. Basic Obligations 
The ICESCR imposes a range of obligations upon State Parties. First, rights 
with a material basis are to be progressively realized over time taking into account 
differing development levels.109 Such a principle incorporates that material rights 
may not always have a clearly-defined point at which fulfilment is achieved.110 
Second, states are obliged to use the maximum of their available resources to 
progressively realise rights.111 Third, deliberately retrogressive measures are 
assumed to be prohibited unless necessary to protect “the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant.”112 A deliberately retrogressive measure is one which 
either reduces legal protection or causes a quantitative “backsliding in the effective 
enjoyment of rights.”113 Fourth, states have an obligation to ensure that at least a 
minimum core of each Covenant right is guaranteed.114 Fifth, states hold an 
obligation “of immediate effect” to ensure that rights “will be exercised without 
 
108 Mandy Lau, Community-based Housing Solutions in Hong Kong: How and Why Have They 
Emerged? 20 INT’L J. HOUS. POL’Y. 290, 296 (2020). 
109 Various aspects confer immediate obligations to fulfil, including non-discrimination and 
articles 3, 7 (a) (i), 8, 10 (3), 13 (2) (a), (3) and (4) and 15 (3); see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and 
Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, 
of the Covenant), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter CESCR, General 
Comment 3, Obligations]. 
110 The right to health, for example, requires new forms of fulfilment as technology improves. 
111 CESCR, General Comment 3, Obligations, supra note 109, ¶ 10. 
112 CESCR, General Comment 3, Obligations, supra note 109, ¶ 9. 
113 Aoife Nolan et al., Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the Prohibition 
of Retrogression in Economic and Social Rights, in Economic and Social Rights after the Global 
Financial CRISIS 121, 123 (Aoife Nolan ed., 2014) [hereinafter Nolan et al., Retrogression]. 
114 CESCR, General Comment 3, Obligations, supra note 109, ¶ 10. 
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discrimination.”115 Sixth, states hold international obligations toward assistance 
and cooperation.116 Seventh, states hold obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the 
right.117 Respect entails non-interference by the state, protect entails preventing 
interference in rights by third parties, and fulfil entails the progressive realization 
of rights.  
Another important source of obligations comes from the General Comment 
on the Right to Housing. General Comments are considered authoritative 
interpretations of the right itself and are not legally binding, but most elements at 
least are generally accepted. The right to housing “should be seen as the right to 
live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.”118 The report considers the nature 
of “adequate housing” to include “adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate 
security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and 
adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at a reasonable 
cost.”119 From this it defines specific content for the right in seven areas: Legal 
security of tenure; Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; 
Affordability; Habitability; Accessibility; Location; Cultural adequacy.120 These 
provide specific standards to which the principles governing state obligations can 
be applied. Therefore, if the state causes, or fails to protect from third parties 
causing, retrogression on any such standard it would be in violation of the 
Covenant, unless it could be “fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant.”121 
B. General Comment 24 
The CESCR’s General Comment 24 elaborates on “State Obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context 
of Business Activities.”122 This covers many aspects specifically related to 
marketized human rights. Two main points are relevant. First, it reifies the core of 
the state duty to protect: “a State party would be in breach of its obligations under 
the Covenant where the violation [by a business enterprise] reveals a failure by the 
State to take reasonable measures that could have prevented the occurrence of the 
event.”123 Rather more expansively, and with links to economic policy, it notes that 
 
115 CESCR, General Comment 3, Obligations, supra note 109, ¶ 1. 
116 CESCR, General Comment 3, Obligations, supra note 109, ¶ 13. 
117 This does not appear in General Comment 3 but was formulated in its final version in Asbjorn 
Eide (Special Rapporteur on Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right), ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987). It has been used by the CESCR since General Comment 
No. 12, The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), ¶ 15, E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999). 
118 CESCR, General Comment 4, Housing, supra note 27, ¶ 7. 
119 CESCR, General Comment 4, Housing, supra note 27, ¶ 7. 
120 CESCR, General Comment 4, Housing, supra note 27, ¶ 8. 
121 CESCR, General Comment 3, Obligations, supra note 109, ¶ 9. 
122 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15. 
123 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 32. 
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“[t]he obligation to respect… is violated when States parties prioritize the interests 
of business entities over Covenant rights without adequate justification.” 124 These 
comments indicate that one fundamental principle underlying the provision by 
business of human rights materialities, such as housing, is that these businesses at 
least do no harm to the right. This fully aligns with the fundamental basis of the 
state duty to protect, defined as a duty to prevent interference in rights by third 
parties. 
Second, it goes beyond the state duty to protect (in the non-interference 
sense predicated on “actively violating right”)125 by linking the regulation of 
business actors to the duty to progressively realize rights. Regarding privatization, 
“[t]he provision by private actors of goods and services essential for the enjoyment 
of Covenant rights should not lead the enjoyment of Covenant rights to be made 
conditional on the ability to pay.”126 Regarding housing, “[s]tates would violate 
their duty to protect Covenant rights… by failing to regulate the real estate market 
and the financial actors operating on that market so as to ensure access to affordable 
and adequate housing for all.”127 It goes further in stating that the obligation to 
protect includes “exercising rent control in the private housing market as required 
for the protection of everyone’s right to adequate housing.”128 The UNSR on the 
right to housing, in the financialization report, notes similarly that commodified 
housing generates obligations that “extend well beyond a traditional understanding 
of the duty to simply prevent private actors from actively violating rights.”129 
Rather, states must “ensure that the rules under which [companies] operate are 
consistent with the realization of the right to adequate housing.”130  
It must be noted that the above quotations from General Comment 24 are 
incorporated under the subheading “obligation to protect.” But both, and 
particularly the housing comment, go beyond preventing interference in the right 
by third parties. Rather, because “the housing market” - including regulation of the 
private sector, state subsidies and other modifications of the free market - is the 
method by which the state has chosen to meet its obligations, market regulation 
must “ensure access to affordable and adequate housing for all.”131 This overtly 
links market regulation with the state duty to fulfil rights. Where rights have been 
successfully marketized, therefore, there is not always a significant distinction 
between the “protect” and “fulfil” limbs. A law such as rent control could be seen 
as protection against business interference in the right to housing, or as part of 
 
124 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 12. 
125 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 14. 
126 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 22. 
127 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 18. 
128 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 19. 
129 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 14. 
130 UNSR, Financialization, supra note 4, ¶ 15. 
131 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 18. 
2021  Santa Clara Journal of International Law  19:1 
 
 18 
realization of the right. This blurring of the distinction is also evident when we 
consider how the CESCR defines the obligation to protect in General Comment 24: 
“[t]he obligation to protect means that States parties must prevent effectively 
infringements of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of business 
activities.” Exactly what constitutes an “infringement” in terms of corporations 
attempting to profit from the right to housing is not perfectly defined but it does not 
appear synonymous with the duty, also positioned under the “protect” limb, “to 
regulate the real estate market and the financial actors operating on that market so 
as to ensure access to affordable and adequate housing for all.”132 
Therefore, the prima facie reading of General Comment 24 is that it breaks 
down any imagined barrier between state and business provision of essential human 
rights. What matters is the human right, and if states cede provision of that right to 
private enterprises the substantive duties of the state do not change. The state is still 
required to progressively realise the right. The scope of duties does not change, but 
the form of the specific duties may do. This is a coherent ethical position, because 
anything less would mean that the level of substantive respect, protection and 
fulfilment owed to an individual would vary based on whether the state supplied it 
directly or outsourced it to other actors. Once a right is comprehensively 
marketized, the obligation to regulate necessarily encompasses all elements of 
tripartite state duties. Nolan makes a similar case regarding privatization of human 
rights, arguing that “while the state may delegate its responsibilities… its obligation 
to fulfill… remains as extensive as before.”133 
As such, states have a duty to regulate the housing market to ensure 
universal access to housing, or at least to ensure that access is progressively realized 
and does not retrogress. However, this duty does not appear to be being met or even 
taken seriously. The specific problems facing the marketized right to housing are 
the retrogression of affordability, the targeting of low-income, “undervalued” 
homes, rising evictions and often homelessness, and a range of further retrogressive 
consequences for other elements of the right such as materials, facilities and 
infrastructure; habitability; and location. Quantitative retrogressions in access to 
the right, including on each specific metric, constitute state breaches unless they 
are necessary to protect the totality of Covenant rights.134 The state is therefore in 
breach along each metric that is retrogressing insofar as these specific problems are 
occurring and the caveats cannot be invoked. The next section turns to how the 
CESCR applies these principles to contemporary housing markets in state reports.  
 
132 CESCR, General Comment 24, Business, supra note 15, ¶ 18. 
133 Nolan, Privatization, supra note 2, at 840. 
134 Nolan et al., Retrogression, supra note 113, at 123-24. 
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C. The Application of Obligations by the CESCR in Concluding 
Observations 
To understand how the CESCR addresses the right to housing in those states 
within well-developed housing markets, I review 16 Concluding Observations 
ranging from 2015-2019, focusing on states are both high GDP per capita and free 
market-oriented, on the assumption that such states will be most prone to significant 
commodification and financialization of housing that impacts affordability, and can 
be assumed generally to be a position to address the affordability problems due to 
their level of development. These states are: Australia;135 Canada;136 Finland;137 
France;138 Germany;139 Hong Kong;140 Ireland;141 Italy;142 Liechtenstein;143 the 
Netherlands;144 New Zealand;145 Portugal;146 South Korea;147 Spain;148 Sweden;149 
and the United Kingdom.150 In the observations on Finland and Liechtenstein the 
right to housing is not addressed, leaving 14 states under review. The 14 cases 
display remarkably similar descriptions of the problems and face similar 
recommendations. Every state is recommended to improve the supply of affordable 
housing, and, bar the Netherlands, every state is recommended to better regulate 
the market to ensure affordable housing.  
This review performs two functions. First, it maps the problems facing the 
right to housing in the most developed private markets and the CESCR’s 
recommendations in this regard. Second, it categorizes how the CESCR addresses 
problems, to understand why human rights obligations have so far failed to generate 
 
135 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic 
Report of Australia, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/5, (July 11, 2017) [hereinafter CESCR, CO 
Australia]. 
136 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic 
Report of Canada, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CAN/CO/6, (Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter CESCR, CO 
Canada]. 
137 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic 
Report of Finland, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/FIN/CO/6, (Dec. 17, 2014) [hereinafter CESCR, CO 
Finland]. 
138 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic 
Report of France, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/FRA/CO/4, (July 13, 2016) [hereinafter CESCR, CO 
France]. 
139 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic 
Report of Germany, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/DEU/CO/6, (Nov. 27, 2018) [hereinafter CESCR, CO 
Germany]. 
140 CESCR, CO Hong Kong, supra note 25. 
141 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic 
Report of Ireland, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, (July 8, 2015) [hereinafter CESCR, CO Ireland]. 
142 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic 
Report of Italy, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/ITA/CO/5, (Oct. 28 2015) [hereinafter CESCR, CO Italy]. 
143 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Combined Second 
and Third Periodic Reports of Liechtenstein, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/LIE/CO/2-3 (July 3, 2017) 
[hereinafter CESCR, CO Liechtenstein]. 
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normatively powerful counter-movements against commodified housing. These 
reports reveal that recommendations can be grouped into three categories based on 
their specificity. First, and by far the most specific is the recommendation that a 
state repeal, reinstate, or promulgate a law or policy. These are primarily based on 
discriminatory rules or rules that are otherwise overtly harmful to specific groups. 
This creates a standard against which the state will be judged, and where the state 
will at least have to explain its non-performance of the recommendation. Second, 
states are advised to spend more, for example on social housing. This is specific in 
its form but never quantifies the amount that is needed, in terms of homes or money. 
This is therefore a standard that can only partially be used to evaluate performance. 
Third is what I will term recommendations for “blue sky regulation.” Market 
regulation is frequently mentioned, but not in ways that are remotely actionable, 
such as Hong Kong being asked to adopt “a human rights approach to housing,” 
with no clue given as to what that would entail.151 This therefore creates no 
meaningful standard and states are demonstrably failing to address such issues. It 
is noteworthy that most of the developed states under review feature few or zero 
recommendations in the first category, suggesting that the normative prohibition on 
such breaches is taken seriously. That every state is recommended to spend more 
and/or regulate the market more effectively suggests that these demands are not 
taken so seriously. I first briefly turn to how the problems facing the right to housing 
are described by the CESCR. 
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D. Defining the Problem 
Before moving onto recommendations, the CESCR first describes the 
problems facing the right to housing within the jurisdiction. While there the 
specifics vary, affordability problems are cited in every case and connected both to 
rising market prices and insufficient government assistance. Most comments also 
mention inadequate responses to homelessness and often issues of discrimination 
that relate in some way to affordability.152 In relation to Germany the CESCR 
describes “the very high level of rents and rent increases; the acute shortage of 
affordable housing… the decreased number of apartments available as social 
housing; and the decreasing and low level of public spending on housing.”153 In 
Australia there is a “[p]ersistent shortage of affordable housing, including rental 
housing and social housing; [an] [i]ncreased number of homeless persons; [and] 
forced evictions disproportionately affecting indigenous peoples in Western 
Australia.”154 In Sweden, the CESCR note recent increases in spending but 
“remains concerned about the shortage of housing in the State party, especially in 
main cities, the limited access to affordable tenancies and the lack of social housing, 
which generate homelessness.”155 Ireland suffers from a lack of social housing, 
rising prices, “[i]neffective social support programmes,” increasing mortgage 
arrears, and rising homelessness “as a result of the lack of social housing and the 
inadequate levels of rent supplement.”156 In Spain the CESCR “is concerned at the 
shortage of social housing stock; the worsening shortage of affordable housing, 
particularly in the private market, as a result of excessively high prices; and the lack 
of adequate protection of security of tenure”, also noting the “large number of 
homeless persons.”157 In Korea the CESCR cites “inadequate dwellings… high 
housing costs… housing shortages; and the lack of adequate protection of tenants 
against forced evictions.”158 Canada is described as in a persistent “housing crisis.” 
Concerns include “insufficient funding for housing… inadequate housing 
subsidy… the shortage of social housing units; and increased evictions related to 
 
152 Discrimination is prevalent against the Roma in Europe, indigenous groups in Australia and 
Canada, undocumented migrants in the Netherlands and against other ethnic minorities in 
multiple states. Frequently discrimination intersects with the affordability crisis, whether because 
undocumented migrants cannot access social housing (CESCR, CO Netherlands, supra note 144, 
¶ 39), indigenous Australians are facing forced evictions (CESCR, CO Australia, supra note 135, 
¶¶ 41(e); 42(d)-(e)), or because the general crisis more significantly affects those already 
suffering discrimination, such as the Roma in Portugal (CESCR, CO Portugal, supra note 146, ¶ 
20). 
153 CESCR, CO Germany, supra note 139, ¶ 54. It should be noted that in Germany’s case the 
Committee notes a forthcoming increase in spending on social housing. 
154 CESCR, CO Australia, supra note 135, ¶¶ 41(a), (b), (e). 
155 CESCR, CO Sweden, supra note 149, ¶ 37. 
156 CESCR, CO Ireland, supra note 141, ¶ 26(a)-(e). 
157 CESCR, CO Spain, supra note 148, ¶ 35. 
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rental arrears.”159 France face “housing shortages, including shortages of social 
housing, affordable housing and emergency shelters.”160 Very similar comments 
are made in relation to Italy, New Zealand, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. 
The Netherlands is the exception because the only concern in relation to general 
housing is “the significant rise in homelessness.”161 However as one 
recommendation in this regard is “securing affordable social housing” it does not 
suggest that the Netherlands has escaped the affordability crisis.162 
E. Direct Violations 
With affordability issues universally cited and linked to a range of serious 
externalities, the CESCR then turns to its recommendations regarding the right to 
housing. The first categorization is defined here as “direct violations” and features 
strongly worded condemnation by the CESCR of a specific law or practice. These 
are direct and clear statements of breach by the state party which strongly imply the 
existence of a rights-violative government action. In being direct, stating that the 
state should “repeal” laws or “halt the policy,” the CESCR creates a clear standard 
against which to measure future performance, forces a direct response from the 
state if it fails to adhere to the recommendation, and lays out clearly that this policy 
is antithetical to human rights standards, therefore providing guidance to the state. 
Aside from some issues grounded in discrimination, the right to housing generates 
few clear direct violations.  
Although the CESCR tends to be clearest over egregious breaches, it is also 
willing to make ambitious recommendations that are unlikely to be accepted if they 
can be defined in terms of direct violations requiring a simple legal change. One 
example of this is the demand that Hong Kong allow migrant domestic workers to 
live outside the home in which they work. Hong Kong should “[t]ake immediate 
action to repeal the two-week rule and the live-in requirement and eliminate 
conditions that render migrant domestic workers vulnerable to compulsory labour 
and sexual assault.”163 The recommendation is clear that the rules be repealed on 
the basis that the live-in requirement subjects such workers to the risk of abuse and 
exploitation and the CESCR is therefore comfortable making a direct 
recommendation. It does however represent a form of utopianism from the CESCR. 
It would mean 200,000 extra homes, or bed spaces at least, were needed instantly 
in a region with under 2.5 million total housing units and already under great strain 
 
159 CESCR, CO Canada, supra note 136, ¶ 39. 
160 CESCR, CO France, supra note 138, ¶ 35. 
161 CESCR, CO Netherlands, supra note 144, ¶ 42. 
162 CESCR, CO Netherlands, supra note 144, ¶ 43. 
163 CESCR, CO Hong Kong, supra note 25, ¶ 43(b) (two-week rule mandates that upon leaving 
their employer migrant domestic workers must leave Hong Kong within two weeks unless they 
find new employment. Migrant domestic workers must also ‘live-in’ their employer’s home). 
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to provide more housing.164 The Hong Kong government responded with this 
argument and rejected the recommendation.165 The CESCR presumably knew that 
there was minimal chance of being accepted and yet they were willing to make the 
demand. Therefore significant, expensive and unlikely-to-be-accepted changes are 
recommended if the demand can be framed as altering a rights-violative law. This 
is important because it demonstrates that it is not merely minimalism that underlies 
the CESCR’s failure to address the retrogression of access to housing, but rather 
that the form of breach is the most important element in generating clear 
recommendations.    
There are a smattering of other, housing-related, clearly-defined 
recommendations that states can provably be found to be in compliance with, or 
not. France should “[d]efer the implementation of eviction orders regarding 
households whose members include schoolchildren.”166 In Italy, the CESCR was 
bolstered by court rulings and therefore stated that Italy should “[d]etermine 
without delay the minimum essential levels as core elements of housing required to 
meet the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, in line 
with the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 2007 and 2008.”167 Even these are not 
ideal examples. In reality housing demonstrably fails to generate clear 
recommendations. It is worth contrasting housing with some examples from other 
areas. Australia’s offshore migrant detention centres feature the following 
recommendations: 
The Committee urges the State party to:  
(a) Halt its policy of offshore processing of asylum claims;  
(b) Complete the closure of the regional processing centres, repatriate all concerned 
persons to Australia and process their asylum claims with all procedural safeguards, 
while respecting their right to family reunification.168 
This is a clear recommendation alleging a clear violation against which 
Australia’s future conduct can be judged. Regarding discrimination, Korea is 
recommended to “[a]brogate the provision of the military criminal act, which 
 
164 Maren Boersma, Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong: Between Permanence and 
Temporariness in Everyday Life, 67.2 CURR. SOCIO. 273, 273 (2019). 
165 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government, Response to the List 
of Issues raised by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
relation to the second periodic report of the People’s Republic of China, ¶¶ 40.1-.3 [hereinafter 
HKSAR, Response],  
https://www.cmab.gov.hk/doc/en/documents/policy_responsibilities/Response_to_LOI-
ICESCR(Eng)(3_3_14).pdf (last visited July 26, 2019). 
166 CESCR, CO France, supra note 142, ¶ 39(c). 
167 CESCR, CO Italy, supra note 146, ¶ 45(c). 
168 CESCR, CO Australia, supra note 139, ¶18(a)-(b). 
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criminalizes same-sex acts.”169 Hong Kong is urged to “take all necessary measures 
to amend the Employment Ordinance to allow the reinstatement of trade unionists 
arbitrarily dismissed for participating in trade-union activities.”170 In states where 
legal gaps and discriminatory or otherwise overtly violative laws are in place the 
recommendations are often clearer. Taking the two recent (2019) Concluding 
Observations as examples, Mauritius was urged “to make the necessary legislative 
changes with a view to repealing section 250 of the Criminal Code, fully protecting 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons from discrimination.”171 
Kazakhstan is recommended to amend “article 402 of the Criminal Code and 
section 177 of the Labour Code, to ensure that workers can exercise their right to 
strike, without undue restrictions.”172 
If we contrast this to how the law around tenancy legislation is addressed, 
we see a clear distinction. The Spanish case is typical. It was recommended to 
“[r]eview its tenancy legislation and make the necessary amendments to ensure 
adequate protection for security of tenure and to provide for effective judicial 
mechanisms that guarantee protection of the right to adequate housing.”173 The 
problem with this recommendation is that it provides no real guidance and no 
specific change against which the Spanish government can be measured. The Hong 
Kong government was forced to reject the CESCR’s proposal regarding the “live-
in” requirement and explain why. The Spanish government can claim this review 
is ongoing and some amendments have been made regardless of whether 
substantive review or change is occurring. The failure to create clear standards 
mean that there is no meaningful judgement criteria established, and breach is likely 
to continue. 
F. State Provision and Subsidy 
The second form of recommendation is that of increasing state provision 
and/or subsidy. Here the demand is reasonably clear – the state should spend more 
– but it is never defined exactly how much or when the problem will be considered 
to be adequately addressed. It therefore should motivate action, or at least inaction 
will require clear explanation, but the action undertaken may be unsatisfactory. 
Every state in this review is recommended to increase spending, either through 
increased provision of public housing or through increasing subsidies and other 
means of assisting individuals in the private market, and often both are required. 
For example, Portugal should “[p]rovide for resources that are proportionate to the 
 
169 CESCR, CO Korea, supra note 151, ¶ 25(a). 
170 CESCR, CO Hong Kong, supra note 25, ¶ 44 
171 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Rep. 
of Mauritius, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MUS/CO/5 (Apr. 5, 2019). 
172 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic 
Rep. of Kazakhstan., ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/KAZ/CO/2 (Mar. 29, 2019). 
173 CESCR, CO Spain, supra note 148, ¶ 36(c). 
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unmet need for social housing, and for appropriate forms of financial housing 
support, such as rental subsidies.”174 Sweden should “[i]ncrease the availability of 
affordable tenancies and consider allocating resources to social housing so as to 
meet the demand.”175 Ireland should “increase the number of social housing units 
so as to satisfy the high demand and to reduce the long waiting list.”176 Very similar 
recommendations are provided to every other state in the review. 
Next I discuss a case study of the UK to provide context. The CESCR 
recommended that the UK “[a]dopt all necessary measures to address the housing 
deficit by ensuring a sufficient supply of housing, in particular social housing units, 
especially for the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.”177 
Here there is clarity about the problem, but the remedy suggested is vague and 
therefore creates no meaningful obligation. It is highly unlikely the UK will ensure 
“a sufficient supply of housing” before the next reporting period, but a reasonable 
figure could have been given based on research in different regions. A 2018 
government report said the UK may need up to 340,000 new homes per year,178 
also citing research that 145,000 “must be affordable homes.”179 Currently, the rate 
of new demand for affordable homes is comfortably outstripping the rate of new 
supply.180 The CESCR could have selected a minimum figure, including for 
affordable housing, thereby turning housing supply into a metric on which the UK 
could be evaluated. The link to regulation is also important. So long as the UK 
retains its market-oriented approach to housing, social housing costs will continue 
to rise. Since the mid-1980s around 90% of all housing has been built privately. 
Research from 2016 showed that £9.3 billion in housing benefit went to private 
landlords, 37% of the total spend.181 Private tenants paid on average £110.34 a 
week, whereas those in local authority homes paid £82.76 a week.182 The rising 
costs of both ownership and rent perpetually force more individuals into claiming 
housing benefit, and this also has a knock-on effect on habitability and other factors. 
This significant outgoing by the state to private landlords is not conducive to the 
 
174 CESCR, CO Portugal, supra note 146, ¶ 15(b). 
175 CESCR, CO Sweden, supra note 149, ¶ 38(a). 
176 CESCR, CO Ireland, supra note 141, ¶ 27(b). 
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state devoting the maximum available resources to all Covenant rights.183 Therefore 
market regulation is the essential partner to subsidy. 
G. Market Regulation 
Regulatory requirements are by far the vaguest. Here, neither victim, 
violation nor remedy are adequately defined in relation to the under-regulated 
market.  There are numerous examples of vague suggestions that states should 
improve regulation, without offering any specifics. New Zealand is asked to 
“[r]edouble its efforts to regulate the private housing market, including by 
controlling rent increases.”184 Korea should “[p]ut into place mechanisms to 
regulate rising housing costs in the private sector, including unreasonable housing 
costs.”185 Italy should “[a]dopt comprehensive national housing legislation, 
including legislation on rent control that promotes affordable rental housing.”186 
Likewise Canada should “[r]egulate rental arrangements with a view to ensuring 
that tenants enjoy the right to affordable and decent housing and are not vulnerable 
to forced evictions or homelessness.”187 Ireland should “[c]onsider introducing 
legislation on private rent and increasing rent supplement levels [and] consider 
introducing banking regulations in order to strengthen protection for mortgage 
borrowers in arrears.”188 Germany is asked to “take appropriate measures to 
counteract the impact of speculation in urban residential accommodation on access 
to affordable housing.”189 Spain should “take necessary measures to regulate the 
private housing market in order to improve the accessibility, availability and 
affordability of adequate housing for persons with low incomes.”190 In Sweden, 
“[i]ncrease the availability of affordable tenancies and consider allocating 
resources to social housing.”191 Portugal should “[p]rovide for resources that are 
proportionate to the unmet need for social housing, and for appropriate forms of 
financial housing support, such as rental subsidies.192 Finally, the advice to France 
is slightly more specific because France already has rent control laws in certain 
parts of the country. These laws should “[e]xtend… to other towns where it is 
deemed to be necessary.”193 
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The comments on Hong Kong provide a good case study of the CESCR’s 
vague approach to regulation. While Hong Kong does face practical obstacles in 
realizing the right to housing, the extreme marketization allied with affordability 
and habitability issues outlined above suggest obvious inroads for the CESCR. The 
CESCR was: 
[C]oncerned about the inadequate investment of Hong Kong, China, in providing 
affordable and adequate housing, resulting in a high percentage of the population living in 
informal settlements, industrial buildings, cage-homes and bed-space apartments, which 
do not have adequate services and utilities (art. 11). . .The Committee recommends that 
Hong Kong, China, adopt a human rights approach to reconstruction efforts, thereby 
ensuring appropriate consideration to the availability, affordability and adequacy of 
housing, including temporary housing for new immigrants and single applicants.194  
The recommendation that Hong Kong “adopt a human rights approach to 
reconstruction efforts” has no clear meaning, provides no specific guidance and 
creates no standards against which the Hong Kong government can be judged. In 
response, the government recalls that 30% of households live in public rental 
housing (PRH), state-owned homes with rent of $1,540 per month (as of 2013), 
significantly below market rates.195 However, they also admit that these homes are 
over-subscribed. They aim for a three-year waiting time, but recent figures suggest 
the average is over four years.196 The government plans to build 79,000 new PRH 
flats for the five-year period from 2012/13 to 2016/17; and for the next five-year 
period from 2017/18 to 2021/22.197  
Taken in isolation, the government’s response to a difficult housing 
problem seems reasonable. But the volte-face is an almost complete withdrawal 
from market regulation leading to soaring prices for substandard and sometimes 
unsafe accommodation.198 The government states that it “had no plan to introduce 
rent control” due to fears it will “discourage landlords from renting out their 
premises” and cause upfront price increases, disadvantaging those most in need.199 
It “considers that the best way is to tackle the problem at source by increasing 
housing supply, in particular the supply of PRH flats; as well as cooling down the 
overheated property market.”200 The HKSAR Government did announce an 
enhancement to the Special Stamp Duty and the introduction of Buyer’s Stamp 
Duty in October 2012 targeting individuals buying second properties and 
corporations,201 however a series of loopholes allow large investors to bypass the 
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tax.202 There is minimal evidence that this has impacted the property market. The 
property market dipped in 2018, but this was attributed to the fall in the value of 
the Chinese Yuan.203 Prices are predicted to rise up to 15% in 2019. 204 Rental prices 
have continued to increase to ever higher record levels.205  
These minimalistic interventions will do nothing to assist those currently 
living in cage homes, nor those forced to devote the majority of their salary to rent. 
These two examples could easily have standards created around them, such as that 
the median rent-income ratio for individuals in private accommodation should fall 
by a percentage in the next reporting window. The failure to specify such standards 
means that the Hong Kong government can ignore these issues and continue with 
its business-centric approach to housing. The government’s response exemplifies 
the withdrawal from market regulation and coterminous partial alleviation of the 
subsequent harm. The right to housing is retrogressing and unrealized on key 
indices (particularly affordability, habitability and services) but the CESCR fails to 
insist on improvements in normatively powerful ways. 
III. THE “CLEAR VIOLATIONS” PARADIGM 
Critiques of socio-economic rights often stress their minimalism, reliance 
on sufficiency, and aspirational form, to name a few.206 The review above suggests 
that none of these accurately describe the problem facing the right to housing. As 
identified regarding Hong Kong and live-out housing for migrant domestic workers 
the CESCR is at least not uniformly minimalistic. Moreover, it does not neatly 
correlate to sufficiency, or protection of the minimum core, since even large 
quantitative increases in homelessness are not adequately addressed. As such it 
does not perfectly fit contemporary critiques of inegalitarian human rights. Rather, 
a different prioritization strategy, one rooted in the form of the harmful act, appears 
to underlie the CESCR’s technique. This has connections to the legalism critique 
of human rights,207 the idea of rights as (only) rules to be enforced, but may be 
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better defined by looking at Kenneth Roth’s stated approach as director of Human 
Rights Watch (HRW). Activist organizations like HRW “should look for ESC 
[economic, social and cultural rights] situations in which there is relative clarity 
about violation, violator, and remedy.”208 He continues:  
[HRW] must be able to show persuasively that a particular state of affairs amounts 
to a violation of human rights standards, that a particular violator is principally or 
significantly responsible, and that a widely accepted remedy for the violation 
exists.209 
These Roth terms situations of “clear violation.”210 These are the correct 
focal point for HRW because “the principal power of groups like Human Rights 
Watch is our ability to hold official conduct up to scrutiny and to generate public 
outrage.”211 Roth adopts a similar method and rationale to Audrey Chapman’s 
“violations approach” to monitoring state compliance with the ICESCR.212 
Chapman described progressive realization as “inexact” and “lack[ing] concrete 
standards.”213 She advocates a “more limited and focused emphasis on 
violations.”214 Such a focus is more “tangible” than the “optimistic” requirements 
of progressive realization, and “the stigma of being labeled a human rights violator 
is one of the few ‘weapons’ available to human rights monitors.”215 Chapman 
defines three types of violation that the CESCR should focus upon:  
(1) violations resulting from actions and policies on the part of governments; (2) 
violations related to patterns of discrimination; and (3) violations related to a state's 
failure to fulfill the minimum core obligations of enumerated rights.216 
Chapman’s approach is more expansive than Roth’s, and both note that the 
Covenant rights themselves should not be restricted merely to these violations.217 
It is understandable that such an approach leads to greater normative legitimacy 
when making claims or judgements. If one can clearly show that actor A has 
violated rule B causing harm to individual C, liberal conceptions of justice would 
agree that C deserves remedy, and often that A deserves punishment.218 Where a 
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problem, such as retrogressing affordability, is occurring but multiple actors are 
contributing, and the impact is not a direct and uniform breach of individuals’ 
human rights (for example, some individuals can still afford homes), it is more 
difficult to make a clear allegation of violation. 
There is a definite overlap between the CESCR’s framing of 
recommendations and these “violations approaches.” Where there is “clarity about 
violation, violator, and remedy,”219 the CESCR can recommend a direct policy 
change, as occurred with Australia’s migrant detention centres and Korea’s partial 
criminalization of same-sex relationships.220 Roth notes this form of violation in 
stating that violations are “clearest when it is possible to identify arbitrary or 
discriminatory governmental conduct that causes or substantially contributes to an 
ESC rights violation.”221 Roth continues, “[t]hese three dimensions are less clear 
when the ESC shortcoming is largely a problem of distributive justice.”222 Just as 
Roth perceives HRW to lack normative validity over distributive questions and so 
he shies away from them, so the CESCR is tentative in this area, refusing to set 
clear standards around how much should be spent, which redistributive laws are 
needed, and how the housing market should be regulated. Although the CESCR 
does address these questions, as its mandate requires, it does so in vague ways that 
obfuscate the requirements and fails to construct “clear violations” or any 
compliance standards.  
The history and empirics of the marketized right to housing, discussed 
above, demonstrates that the obligation to regulate to ensure affordable housing for 
all is not taken as a priority by many governments. Roth is correct that it may invoke 
complex issues of domestic spending and regulatory priorities. But the consequence 
of this failure to address the systemic problem is that it festers and evolves until, 
for example, in Spain in 2017, there were 100 evictions a day,223 in Madrid 
Blackstone purchased social housing and increased the average rent 49%,224 in 
Sweden average rental rates rose between 59 and 84 per cent from 2009-2017,225 
and as Philip Alston found on his mission to the USA, in 2017 there were an average 
of 114,829 homeless children per night. 226 
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Any one of these situations could be seen as a “clear violation,” but they are 
part of a larger structural crisis rather the result of singular arbitrary policies.227 The 
failure to address these issues at their source – the failure to focus on macro-level 
affordability and the root causes of its retrogression – constructs the framework 
rendering such issues inevitable.228 The “clear violations” approach occludes the 
two major breaches of the ICESCR of relevance: first, it occludes meaningful 
critique of quantitative retrogressions, such as around affordability, because it is 
gradual and because neither the state nor individual companies overtly, 
deliberately, cause the whole crisis. Second, it occludes the lack of appropriate 
corporate regulation and business acts within this deregulated environment that are 
a major source of the affordability crisis. It could be the case that singular business 
acts such as “poor doors,” special entrances to buildings for those in affordable 
units, and the related exclusion from the full use of facilities, could be considered 
“clear violations.”229 Such cases at least feature the tripartite victim, violator, 
remedy structure. But such punctual interventions are the antithesis of systemic 
change. In limiting themselves to these types of interventions, the human rights 
activist ignores the systemic crisis, allowing it to proliferate. 
IV. CONSTRUCTING CLEAR VIOLATIONS 
The problem therefore is that profiteering private companies together 
constitute a retrogressive market that in totality causes egregious harm to the right 
without ever constituting a single moment we could call a “clear violation.” Two 
contradictory truths thereby exist simultaneously: One, housing is legally 
guaranteed human right subject to the protection and realization of the seven core 
elements in the General Comment. Two, the laws enabling, and actions by, private 
companies which retrogress or otherwise deny elements of the right to individuals 
– even where the effect is severe - are not meaningful breaches. With affordability 
neutered, a domino effect plays over habitability, services, location, and other 
elements. It is submitted that, at least, Roth and Chapman have accurately described 
an extant norm within contemporary human rights practice. It is a problematic norm 
and one that may be malleable under the right conditions, but it does appear to exist, 
as the priorities of the CESCR demonstrate. Therefore, one route out of the problem 
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could be to attempt to construct clear violations from retrogressive acts. The paper 
next proposes a method by which this could be achieved.  
It is recommended that the CESCR in Concluding Observations adopt a 
three-stage process of identification of breach, compliance standard-setting, and 
policy recommendations. First, the type of breach should be clarified. If rent in a 
certain city has risen far beyond inflation, this should be noted as a retrogression of 
affordability that is in breach of Covenant obligations. Externalities of this, such as 
rising evictions or homelessness, should be noted as independent breaches as well 
as linked to the root cause. State breaches should also be constructed from the 
failure to regulate the acts of private companies, such as their high levels of 
evictions, fee-charging, or rent increases. The quantitative situation should be 
analysed covering the seven criteria plus homelessness and evictions. If there is a 
lack of fulfilment or retrogressions by any quantitative measure, that should be 
noted as a prima facie breach unless necessary to protect the totality of Covenant 
rights. The state is under an obligation to explain why such a prima facie breach 
occurred and why the breach was necessary or unpreventable.  
For example, the income-housing costs ratio in Dublin of 86.3% should be 
considered a breach of the duty to “ensure access to affordable and adequate 
housing for all.”230 House price increases of over 50 per cent in Hong Kong since 
2011 should be defined as a quantitative retrogression of affordable housing that 
violates state duties. The continuing blight of substandard accommodation in Hong 
Kong should be linked to the affordability crisis, and noted as a separate breach. 
Increasing homelessness was mentioned in many Concluding Observations, 
including the UK. This should be clarified as a prima facie breach of state 
obligations. Specific acts by private companies and the laws that permit them 
should also be listed as breaches. Blackstone’s actions such raising rents by 49% in 
a year in Madrid, “land-hoarding” by investors in Ireland, vacant homes in 
Melbourne,231 and high eviction rates constitute prima facie breaches of the duty to 
protect as defined in General Comment 24. In latter case it invokes a failure to 
adequately guarantee legal security of tenure. Although not necessarily a breach of 
duties, states could be asked why such favourable tax conditionalities, such as 
REITs, are necessary, and whether they are the most conducive means by which to 
fulfil the right to housing.  
Second, with these breaches noted, clear standards should be set by which the state 
can be judged. Unaffordable housing could be addressed by setting a target income-
housing costs ratio. As noted above, the US and Canada each use a 30 per cent 
ratio.232 It may vary in different states, but at least states must develop such a 
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standard, and perhaps, if they want to set it above 30 per cent, explain why a higher 
standard is needed. In areas where the ratio is far above 30 per cent, a realistic but 
ambitious reduction target should be set based on the duty to progressively realise 
the right to housing, and drawing on local expertise to establish a value. Relatedly, 
standards should be set for the levels of rent increases allowed by private companies 
in unaffordable markets. Ireland, in “rental pressure zones,” allows rent increases 
of 4 percent per year, although there are problematic loopholes.233 Proposition 10 
in California would have allowed a maximum 15 percent increase over three 
years.234 In both cases, where regulation exists it appears to coalesce around similar 
figures around the world, and these therefore constitute reasonable norms to apply 
as compliance standards. Regarding legal security of tenure, the specific reasons 
for insecurity in each jurisdiction should be noted, rather than the generalized 
statement that the state should “[r]eview its tenancy legislation and make the 
necessary amendments.”235 While this would increase the research burden on treaty 
bodies, they should be able to consult experts to get an understanding of the 
problems.   
One example pf problematic tenancy legislation from the US is that of “land 
instalment contracts” (LICs). These combine a rental and sale contract, where the 
buyer is part buying and part-renting the home. The buyer makes a large down-
payment for part of the value of the home, takes out a loan from the seller for this 
part of the contract, and pays rent for the rest. This allows those who could not 
afford a traditional mortgage to more gradually take ownership of a home. Similar 
models are used effectively in the UK.236 However, LICs in the US are “lightly 
regulated” and “are designed to fail.”237 They “often carry high interest rates and 
significant penalties for late payment.”238 If payments are late “these contracts 
revert to rental agreements.”239 The process is described as follows: 
These contracts often include language that voids the purchase agreement for late payment. 
The contract then becomes a month-to-month agreement, and the buyer can be evicted. 
Once an eviction is complete, the seller seeks a new buyer.240 
LICs would appear to constitute one variety of a failure to enforce adequate legal 
security of tenure. This example is from the US, which is not party to the ICESCR. 
Nonetheless, other treaty bodies, such as the Committee on the Elimination of 
 
233 Ireland Letter, supra note 10, at 3. 
234 Ballotpedia, California Rent Control Initiative, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Rent_Control_Initiative_(2020) (last visited July 26, 2019). 
235 CESCR, CO Spain, supra note 152, ¶ 36(c). 
236 Eleanor Wilkinson & Iliana Ortega-Alcazar, A Home of One’s Own? Housing Welfare for 
‘Young Adults’ in Times of Austerity, 37.3 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 329 (2017). 
237 Tenancy, supra note 57, at 10. 
238 Tenancy, supra note 57, at 10. 
239 Tenancy, supra note 57, at 10. 
240 Tenancy, supra note 57, at 11. 
2021  Santa Clara Journal of International Law  19:1 
 
 34 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), monitoring the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the US has ratified, may be interested 
in the “discriminatory impact” of business practices and the laws which permit 
them,241 such as LICs.242  
Third, means by which the state could meet this standard should be noted. 
Regarding affordability, these may include rent control laws or increased state 
subsidization. It may involve disincentivizing the mass purchase of rental 
properties through taxation or other means. Legal security of tenure will require the 
enactment or repeal of specific laws based on their facticity in each state party. 
States should be wary of only using subsidies to improve affordability as that could 
lead to significantly higher spending that may contravene the obligation to devote 
the maximum available resources to all Covenant rights. 243 Detailed explanations 
should be sought where states both fail to take up these suggestions and continue 
to breach the obligation. The CESCR should also note that housing entails business 
responsibilities. The CESCR in General Comment 24 noted that states should 
implement human rights due diligence laws “in order to identify, prevent and 
mitigate the risks of violations of Covenant rights, to avoid such rights being 
abused, and to account for the negative impacts caused or contributed to by their 
decisions and operations… on the enjoyment of Covenant rights.”244 The CESCR 
should note that human rights due diligence must apply to investments in housing 
and should clarify its necessary scope and content. 
This three-stage process of identification of breach, standard-setting, and 
policy suggestions would take the problem identified above of the long-term 
retrogression of affordability, and its relationship to profit-seeking actors, and 
create clear objectives against which states could be judged. It would therefore 
transform the current vague demands into meaningful evaluative criteria. This also 
would assist activists in using international law to pressure states, and, as Guzman 
notes, increased clarity of violation increases the likelihood of meaningful 
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“reputational sanctions” – states losing status in the international community due 
to breaches of international law - occurring through the right to housing.245  
There is a relationship between this strategy and elements of a further report 
by Farha, as UNSR on the right to housing, into “human rights-based [housing] 
strategies.” 246 She advocates ten principles, some of which directly connect to the 
three-stage process of constructing clear violations described above. Principle two, 
to “prioritize those most in need and ensure equality,”247 focuses on problem-
identification, including that of the “unaffordability of housing for those in the 
lowest income brackets.”248 Principle six describes standard-setting based on 
“human rights-based goals and timelines,”249 and entails the use of “process,” 
“outcome” and “structural” indicators250 to create “reasonable” goals.251 The UNSR 
further notes, in concordance with “clear violations,” that once states have 
established their goals, “[f]ailures to meet [them], unless justified by unforeseen 
events or circumstances, constitute violations of human rights for which States 
should be held accountable.”252 Principle seven, accountability and monitoring, is 
closely connected in that goals must be based on accurate quantitative data.253 
Principle nine focuses on policy recommendations as related to “the obligations of 
private actors and regulate financial, housing and real estate markets.”254 As per the 
link established above between private actors and fulfilment in situations of 
commodified human rights, states must “ensure that the actions of private actors 
and investors are consistent with the State’s obligation to fulfil the right to 
housing.”255 As such “housing strategies may, for example, require investors to 
produce affordable rather than luxury housing.”256 
This report focused specifically on national housing strategies. It therefore 
did not speak directly to the CESCR. Nonetheless, these principles could be applied 
by the CESCR in Concluding Observations where relevant. Reflexively, the three-
stage method described above is useful in linking the different principles together. 
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For example, if a lack of affordable housing is a problem under principle two within 
a jurisdiction, the state should set a reasonable target by which to reduce the 
income-housing costs ratio (principle six), and the one policy by which this should 
be achieved will be stronger business regulation (principle nine), such as a 
mandatory quantity of affordable housing within each development. Clarifying this 
specific form of linkage between the principles may assist state parties in 
developing coherent strategies, as well as assisting others in holding states to 
account. 
There is always the overarching problem that states need private companies 
to invest in housing, and the current system may be argued to be the least bad 
option, particularly by those leaders with ideological predilections towards the free 
market. Even so, the current system is causing clear and ongoing breaches of the 
right and as such states are still required to address these issues. When looking at 
the freedom and indeed benefits that companies like Blackstone have been granted 
to buy individuals homes, and the high profit margins they earn, it is implausible 
that there is not some additional regulation that could be implemented. Even if 
states refuse to take the more extreme measures, there are targeted interventions 
that could be made, and there is value in reifying that accelerating prices, rising 
evictions and homelessness are serious breaches of state obligations. Even if states 
may argue that the CESCR, in listing these breaches and recommendations, is 
failing to understand the modern market, there is value in challenging states to think 
differently about these markets. To strengthen the case in relation specifically to 
market actors, it is worth now turning to business responsibilities towards human 
rights, an area of human rights practice that has experienced significant growth in 
the last twenty years, 257  but that has not significantly addressed the marketization 
of human rights materialities.  
V. THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE 
UNGPS 
In this vein, the UNSR on the right to housing stated in 2017 that: 
Despite the growing attention to the importance of business and human rights and 
despite the fact that housing represents the largest global business sector, very little 
attention has been paid to the obligations of business enterprises and financial 
corporations operating in the real estate and housing sector with respect to the right 
to adequate housing.258 
The UN mandate-holders address this topic in their letter to Blackstone. 
Blackstone is accused of a range of harmful practices, particularly in the USA. First, 
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it is worth recalling that business responsibilities under the UNGPs can represent a 
useful inroad into housing rights in the USA. The UNGPs define a “corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights” described as “a global standard of expected 
conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate.”259 Despite the non-
ratification of the ICESCR in the USA, therefore, businesses are expected to respect 
the right to housing therein, and Blackstone, as a private landlord, must be 
cognisant of public opinion. Business responsibilities towards human rights can 
also empower more traditional forms of activism and media critique. 260  
The Blackstone model is based on purchasing “undervalued” homes.261 
Such homes are often undervalued because they are rented by low-income tenants 
in areas experiencing population inflows, particularly of wealthier individuals.262 
Blackstone renovates the properties and significantly increases rents.263 As noted 
above, Blackstone subsidiary Invitation Homes in the US is accused of raising rents 
on low-income housing far beyond market rates and regularly filing for evictions. 
The UN mandate-holders “heard countless stories of tenants’ whose buildings had 
been bought by private equity firms and whose rents had skyrocketed almost 
immediately afterward, sometimes by 30 or even 50 percent.”264 It is also accused 
of excessive fee-charging, such as a $95 fee for late payment of rent and many 
others, all through automated processes.265 This drove “a 22% increase in ancillary 
income, resulting in $2 million of additional revenue.”266 Moreover, just “1 percent 
of Invitation Homes SFRs [single family rentals] are allocated to lowest income 
tenants.”267 This contributes to rising prices and therefore to severe problems 
including homelessness. Blackstone has significant holdings in Los Angeles.268 In 
 
259 Guiding Principles, supra note 15, § 11. 
260 There has been a great deal of activist and media attention paid towards Blackstone in the US. 
See, e.g., Robert Call et. al., Blackstone: Atlanta’s Newest Landlord, OCCUPY OUR HOMES 
ATLANTA (Apr. 2014), https://homesforall.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/BlackstoneReportFinal0407141.pdf; Cory Doctorow, Wall Street 
Landlords are Slumlords, BOINGBOING (July 30, 2018), 
https://boingboing.net/2018/07/30/single-family-rental-securitie.html; Alana Semuels, When Wall 
Street Is Your Landlord, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-family-landlords-wall-
street/582394/; Kevin Sweeting, How Stuy Town Got A Tourniquet While Blackstone Gets 
Billions, GOTHAMIST (Mar. 21, 2016),  
https://gothamist.com/2016/03/31/stuy_town_affordable_housing.php (on Blackstone’s 
ownership of Stuyvesant Town in New York). 
261 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
262 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 5. 
263 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 5. 
264 HRC, Press Release, supra note 64. 
265 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
266 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 3. 
267 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 4. 
268 Blackstone Letter, supra note 6, at 4. 
2021  Santa Clara Journal of International Law  19:1 
 
 38 
June 2019 figures showed a 16 percent rise in homelessness to 36,300 individuals 
in the city of Los Angeles, 58,936 in the wider county.269 The Mayor of Los Angeles 
told a reporter that “housing affordability was the biggest factor driving 
homelessness.”270 Government figures show that one “would need to earn $47.52 
an hour just to afford the median monthly rent” in Los Angeles.271 While 
Blackstone are not accused of breaching any domestic laws, their actions are also 
not respectful of the right to housing. The UN mandate-holders list specific 
responsibilities in the UNGPs, including the responsibility to have in place: 
(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights; (b) 
A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how they address their impacts on human rights; (c) Processes to enable the 
remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they 
contribute.272 
They also list the Blackstone policies that are “inconsistent”273 with human 
rights law: 
The threat of eviction creates fear, anxiety and housing insecurity, inconsistent with 
requirements of the right to housing. Evictions which result in homelessness are a 
violation of the right to housing under international human rights law. Furthermore, 
access to affordable housing – with affordability defined by level of household 
income, not what the market can bear – is a cornerstone obligation of the right to 
adequate housing under international human rights law.274 
This provides a useful starting point, but, like the CESCR, it fails to create 
concrete standards around which companies like Blackstone can be evaluated. 
When, for example, will Blackstone’s effects on the affordability of housing 
constitute a breach of the responsibility to respect under the UNGPs? This is the 
kind of question to which, as the UNSR notes, “very little attention has been 
paid.”275 It is however a fundamental question regarding the right to housing that 
should be explored.276  
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The UNGPs are the most important framework within business and human 
rights and were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011. They cover, as 
noted, all business enterprises in all situations regardless of whether relevant states 
have ratified human rights treaties. They cover at least the International Bill of 
Rights, covering the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ICESCR and 
“the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour 
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”277 
“Depending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to consider additional 
standards.”278 This means that the right to housing as defined in the ICESCR is 
covered by the UNGPs. The UNGPs operate under three pillars: the state duty to 
protect, the corporate responsibility to respect, and access to remedy.279 Pillar two 
is a set of principles grounded in “social norms” that defines the extent of corporate 
responsibility and introduces implementation tools and best practices.280 Principle 
13 under pillar two states that: 
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises:  
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their 
own activities, and address such impacts when they occur;  
(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked 
to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if 
they have not contributed to those impacts.281 
An adverse human rights impact is defined as occurring “when an action 
removes or reduces the ability of an individual to enjoy his or her human rights.”282 
This includes both acts and omissions.283 Corporations therefore have a 
responsibility to avoid acts or omissions that remove or reduce rights enjoyment. 
This is a broad depiction of “respect” responsibilities, beyond the most basic 
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understanding of respect as non-interference.284 It limits corporate responsibility to 
“do no harm,” rather than also including fulfil responsibilities,285 but it defines harm 
as any act that “removes or reduces” rights enjoyment. This explicitly covers 
indirect and difficult to fully quantify forms of impact, for example “targeting high 
sugar food and drinks to children, with an impact on child obesity,”286 and “human 
rights issues that result from environmental impacts—for example, related to water 
and health.”287 It is not limited to legal breaches, and any particular act could 
covered, to be adjudicated based on whether it removed or reduced the ability of an 
individual to enjoy his or her human rights.288 The use of the term “removes or 
reduces” rights enjoyment is key. While “remove” suggests the complete 
annulment of the right, “reduce” is very similar to the conception of “retrogression” 
under the ICESCR, defined as the quantitative backsliding in fulfilment or 
protection of a right.289 Acts by companies that “reduce” access to housing for low-
income individuals are therefore by definition included as adverse impacts. This is 
a vital element of the UNGPs that fosters a broad scope.290 Where multiple 
individuals are adversely impacted, it may meet the criteria of a “severe” impact on 
the grounds of scope,291 and if the impacts cause homelessness or other serious 
problems, it may be severe on the grounds of “scale.”292  
Attribution for impacts is disaggregated into “caused, contributed, linked 
to.”293 To cause is to be the sole or primary cause of the impact. To contribute is to 
be one of many actors involved in an impact, or to provide assistance to the 
commission of an impact, such as complicity in state crimes.294 To be linked to 
requires that the business has no causal or contributory connection, but is linked to 
the impact via its business relationships. If a firm causes or contributes to an impact, 
it has the responsibility prevent, mitigate and/or remedy its own contribution to that 
impact.295 If the firm is linked to an impact caused by another firm through its 
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operations, products or services, the firm has no responsibility to remediate, but 
should use its leverage over the other firm to encourage prevention, mitigation 
and/or remedy.296 Because “linked to” impacts do not generate direct 
responsibilities to prevent, mitigate and remedy, it is important to question whether 
impacts by companies operating in housing markets represent contributions, or 
merely linkages, to the impact. 
Contribution to an impact comes in two forms, which I will define here as 
“cumulative” and “assistive.” Cumulative impacts exist where an individual firm 
may not cause a sizeable amount of harm in and of itself, but where it is part of a 
network of firms that in totality is causing significant harm. Contributions toward 
climate change provide an obvious case-in-point here.297  This is the key form 
related to the business and the right to housing and will be explained further below. 
The second form of contribution occurs when a company assists in a harmful act. 
This was explained by John Ruggie in a reply to the Thun group of banks, where 
he noted that there is “a continuum between contribution and linkage.”298  
A variety of factors can determine where on that continuum a particular 
instance may sit. They include the extent to which a business enabled, encouraged, 
or motivated human rights harm by another; the extent to which it could or should 
have known about such harm; and the quality of any mitigating steps it has taken 
to address it. Asserting that only a bank’s own activities can constitute “contributing 
to” harm, as the paper does, bypasses these critical questions entirely.299 
Ruggie establishes a set of three guidelines: “knowledge”; “enable, 
encourage, or motivate” and “a failure to mitigate.” Where each of these are met, 
the company is firmly at the “contributory” end of the spectrum. It would appear to 
be the case that such situations amount to a contribution unless a strong counter-
argument could be made. Therefore, assistive contributions prima facie occur when 
a firm “knowingly enables” and “fails to adequately mitigate” a human rights 
impact.300 This therefore potentially makes banks and other service providers 
contributors to the human rights impacts of the marketization of housing.301 Where 
a project is very likely to retrogress affordability and is funded by a bank loan, for 
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example, that bank is “enabling” the impact, has not taken steps to mitigate the 
impact, and should be able to, with some research, have knowledge at least in broad 
terms, that the impact would occur.  
Because the “impacts” framework is fairly expansive, including acts which 
“reduce” rights enjoyment and contribute to adverse impacts, it would appear that 
impacts on the right to housing should be comprehensively captured. It is, however, 
necessary to look more specifically at corporate contributions to test the scope and 
limits of responsibility. I will focus on two examples, that of evictions, and that of 
retrogressing the affordability of housing. In the General Comment on the right to 
housing it states that: “instances of forced eviction are prima facie incompatible 
with the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most 
exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of 
international law.”302 It is further added by the UNSR that “[p]rinciples of 
international human rights law [require] that no eviction take place if it will lead to 
homelessness.”303 These, the UNSR continues “have not generally been properly 
applied by domestic courts to evictions linked to defaults on mortgages or rent… 
eviction from homes is routinely applied in the case of unpaid debts.”304 In the letter 
to Blackstone it is clarified that “[e]victions which result in homelessness are a 
violation of the right to housing under international human rights law.”305 
Evictions therefore should, ideally, be regulated by the state with the right 
to housing foregrounded. As is the near-universal case with business human rights 
arguments, the direct business responsibility becomes most relevant where the state 
is unable or unwilling to meet its obligations in this area.306 The eviction of tenants 
in the name of private profit must be considered an adverse impact in areas where 
the individual will be put at risk of homelessness. Further, if that individual would 
be likely to need to relocate far away, or move into substandard accommodation, it 
must be the case that the individual’s “ability to enjoy his or her rights” is at risk of 
being “reduced,”307  along elements of the seven core criteria of the right to housing. 
308 Therefore, applying the language of the UNGPs suggests that such acts are 
prohibited under the UNGPs insofar as they cause such adverse impacts.  
Evictions caused by private landlords increasing prices unreasonably 
constitute a relatively easy question from the contemporary human rights 
perspective because, in Roth’s terms, there is normative clarity around “violation, 
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violator and remedy,”309 albeit there is not an obvious remedial avenue. We can 
demonstrate that X number of low-income individuals have been evicted, identify 
a risk of homelessness or other serious issues, and clearly identify that the corporate 
landlord caused the impact. These individuals have had their enjoyment of human 
rights “removed or reduced” by the actions of a single company. It therefore fits 
the Roth model and can be addressed in a normatively forceful way. It may also be 
the case that other companies that have loaned money to the investor or have other 
links may be contributing to the impact via assistance, following Ruggie’s 
arguments above.  
The harder question is the macro-level retrogressions in affordability, and 
the subsequent retrogressions in habitability and location that are caused by the sum 
total of market actors, rather than by single acts. This question is crucial, however, 
because it represents the root cause of other problems. Building an expensive set of 
homes cannot be considered a human rights violation or even an adverse impact on 
its own, but when market actors build only expensive homes, replace affordable 
homes, and force low-income tenants out due to these policies, it has retrogressive 
impacts on the macro-level. To understand the scope of business responsibility for 
contributions to retrogressing affordability we can turn to the Danish Institute of 
Human Rights (DIHR) guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment. This report 
tested the scope of “impacts” as defined under the UNGPs310 and discussed 
“cumulative impacts” in detail. Cumulative impacts are defined as: “the successive, 
incremental and combined impacts from multiple projects or multiple activities 
located in the same region or affecting the same resource.” One example given is 
the “widespread nature of the impact (e.g., cumulative water use due to tourism 
development reduces water tables, resulting in drought with widespread effect on 
food security in the local community).”311 It states further that: 
Because project developers and regulators tend to focus on assessing impacts of individual 
projects, they often do not consider the incremental impacts on areas or resources used or 
directly impacted by a project from other existing, planned or reasonably defined 
developments.312 
A report into tourism in Myanmar considers various cumulative impacts including 
“[i]ncreased prices of food and goods due to the presence of tourism businesses, 
which makes these goods unaffordable for local populations,”313 and increasing 
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property values that “can lead to the displacement of poorer residents who are 
unable to pay the higher rents.”314 Where cumulative impacts or potential impacts 
are identified the report notes that firms have a responsibility to prevent, mitigate 
and remedy.315 These descriptions of adverse impacts are very relevant to housing 
on the macro-scale. Housing is a rights-relevant resource that is being adversely 
affected by the combined impacts of multiple projects. What is true for tourism 
industries in Myanmar is true for housing developers and speculators in Los 
Angeles, London, Hong Kong, and elsewhere. They are raising prices and pricing 
the poor out or into substandard homes and debt.   
It is important also to clarify that even the macro-level retrogression of 
affordability does constitute an adverse impact just as it constitutes a breach of state 
obligations. Rent increases and the impact on market prices are to be considered a 
cumulative impact for which companies are responsible for their own contribution, 
insofar as they reduce access to the right to housing or other human rights. This 
means that, just as governments should be required to implement rent control laws 
or subsidies, so, in the absence of government action, companies have a 
responsibility to avoid contributing to the retrogression of affordability. The 
definition of impact as acts which remove or reduce an individual’s enjoyment of 
his or her human rights necessarily and overtly incorporates impacts on housing 
affordability. This is a core component of the right to housing as defined by the 
CESCR.316 To exclude it would be to artificially limit the content of the right, an 
argument that appears nowhere in the UNGPs. This element of the right to housing 
is not easily justiciable, but, just as it remains a state obligation even short of 
constitutional justiciability in the jurisdiction,317 it remains a business impact short 
of the availability of judicial remedy. It is perfectly feasible and the correct usage 
of the UNGPs to highlight the cumulative impacts of housing companies on the 
core elements of the right to housing. These companies could perform impact 
assessments taking account of the market, and could mitigate the harm caused by 
building more affordable housing within the project or limiting rent increases. For 
those looking for safe-haven investments they could target only those markets 
which are not suffering serious problems with affordability and so on. These 
companies could also not take every opportunity to increase their share price at the 
expense of individuals. All of these are feasible choices.   
However, much like the CESCR, there is a failure within business and 
human rights more generally to properly apply the wording of the UNGPs and 
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therefore to embrace its potential. The UNGPs are soft law and rely on “social 
norms” to provide a basis for action. Without normative pressure behind allegations 
of impact, the allegations have no power. Probably, in part, because of this, the 
focus area of business and human rights has been on more justiciable human rights 
violations and little attention has been paid to markets.318 This focus excludes those 
acts which are legally-permitted and produce no “clear violation,” but which, as 
part of their cumulative effects, have egregious long-term impacts on the right. 
Despite the impacts framework appearing to fit them comfortably, the engrained 
predilection for clearly-defined violations among experts renders the UNGPs 
voiceless over financialized housing.  
The solution to this problem is therefore identical to that proposed to the 
CESCR. The challenge is to create meaningful responsibilities that will have 
normative force. This requires the same strategy of creating clear violations (clear 
impacts) and clear responsibilities as applied to states. Again, the three-stage 
process of identification of breach, standard-setting, and policy advice is 
recommended. Naturally, as a corporation, Blackstone is only responsible for its 
own impacts on the right to housing, including those connected through business 
relationships, not those of its competitors.319 Regarding evictions, it is clear that 
evictions without good cause represent a breach. The standard should be set at a 
quantitative reduction in eviction rates and a revised process for undertaking 
evictions. The policy recommendations should focus on this process, bringing in 
best practice guidelines.320 This may include setting more relaxed limits on 
initiating evictions, such as only when rent payments have been late for three 
consecutive months, clearer processes by which evictions are organized and can be 
challenged, and a removal of fee-charging for minor breaches of the contract 
agreement. The specifics would depend naturally on the specific problems in each 
market. Each change would improve business respect for the right to housing where 
the state is failing to meet its duties in this regard. Evictions are however rooted in 
affordability – tenants are evicted because they cannot pay. Therefore, it is 
necessary to address profiteering from housing directly.  
BHR experts must work to create clear impacts around retrogressing 
affordability. Again, breach should be noted in terms of price increases, such as 
Blackstone’s seven per cent increase in its Western States market in a single 
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quarter. This verifiably contributes to the retrogression of affordability. Standards 
could borrow from figures such as the four per cent maximum rent increases 
permitted in some parts of Ireland could be cited as maximums that corporations 
should adopt in other jurisdictions controlled by authorities that are unwilling to 
meet their own human rights obligations. There could also be aims set around the 
income-housing costs ratio of tenants, although it would be simpler to focus on rent 
increases as this is the only element such companies control. Nonetheless, BHR 
experts and activists should, for example, note that the US government defines 
affordable housing as at most a 30% income-housing costs ratio, and that in Los 
Angeles one must earn $47.52 an hour to meet median monthly rent.321 This statistic 
can underlie powerful arguments that any retrogressive act by Blackstone in the 
area is contributing to an already harmful cumulative situation.  
Other tools, such as human rights due diligence, should encompass the right 
to housing. Firms should “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their impacts on human rights.” This means that prior to initiating a project 
the level of planned rent increases should be with affordability in mind, “defined 
by level of household income, not what the market can bear.”322 They should 
understand how evictions can be minimized and what other impacts, such as 
“discriminatory effects” they may be at risk of causing.323 These values should be 
identified in consultation with experts and communities.324 Remedial mechanisms 
should be also considered by housing rights organizations such as NCPs and 
NHRIs. NCPs, for example, apply the UNGPs through the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.325 These have various practical limitations, including 
adopting divergent standards, including requiring high burdens of proof; the cost of 
complaints; and a reluctance to determine that firms are in non-compliance with the 
Guidelines.326 Nonetheless, they have sometimes proven powerful in generating 
publicity around cases,327 and sometimes in reaching agreements between 
claimants and company based on a breach of the UNGPs even where no law has 
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been broken.328 Housing rights organization could therefore advance their cause by 
bringing a case to such an institution. As residential landlords, companies like 
Blackstone should be responsive to popular opinion. If its reputation falls too far 
individuals may be unwilling to move into homes owned by them, particularly if 
highlighted by the media. Therefore, if powerful arguments are made against 
Blackstone it is likely that they will respond, as they did within three days to the 
letter sent by the UN mandate-holders.329 Although the UNGPs pillar two is 
grounded in social norms, rather than hard law, it could facilitate real improvements 
if given sufficient attention within the academic and activist field.330  
One area where extra-legal social harm is caused by corporations and that 
has attracted attention to business responsibilities under the UNGPs is climate 
change. The harm caused by climate change, and the specific links to this harm 
caused by polluting corporations, is of a similar form to that related to housing and 
is therefore a comparable case. In both cases corporations contribute to a large-
scale problem with clear human rights impacts, but without it being feasible to 
perfectly define each corporation’s specific impact. One ambitious attempt is being 
undertaken by Greenpeace in the Philippines. A petition to the Philippine 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) notes the severe current and future impacts 
of climate change on the archipelagic nation, including the increase in extreme 
weather events such as super-typhoon Yolanda, which killed over 6000 people.331 
It evidences that human-induced climate change is an important aggravating factor 
in these extreme weather events, and that fossil fuel production is a key driver of 
human-induced climate change.332 It notes further that a small group of “carbon 
majors” (large fossil fuel producing companies) are responsible for a great deal of 
this human-induced climate change.333 Specifically, the petition identified that fifty 
investor-owned Carbon Majors contributed “equivalent to 21.6% of estimated 
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global industrial emissions through 2013.”334 The petition seeks responsibility in 
line with each company’s emissions, also considering when the firm acquired 
knowledge of the harmful effects of its products. This petition is explicitly 
grounded in the UNGPs, stating that it seeks the CHR to determine whether 
“investor-owned Carbon Majors… have breached their responsibility to respect 
human rights [under the UNGPs].”335 It states that the Carbon Majors are “directly 
or indirectly contributing to current or future adverse human rights impacts through 
the extraction and sale of fossil fuels and activities undermining climate action.”336 
It posits breaches of a number of rights: “(a) to life; (b) to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health; (c) to food; (d) to water; (e) to sanitation; 
(f) to adequate housing; and (g) to self-determination resulting from the adverse 
impacts of climate change.”337 
At the time of writing the petition is still under consideration at the CHR. 
While the chance of success is unknown, it demonstrates that the UNGPs appear to 
provide a useful framework for managing human rights impacts that do not easily 
lend themselves to criminal or tortious liability, and/or, that thinking of tortious 
wrongdoing through the UNGPs framework could provide a useful means of 
holding corporations to account for harm caused beyond the traditional scope of the 
law. This evolution in justiciability could be of great importance to all 
environmental and socio-economic rights in an increasingly transnationalized 
future.  
Finally, specific attention should be given to the right to housing within 
discussions around the binding treaty on business and human rights.338 This 
ongoing discussion is organized by the open-ended intergovernmental working 
group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights with a mandate to create a “Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, 
in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises.” A revised draft was released in July 2019.339 The 
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right to housing is not discussed specifically, but the scope covers “all human 
rights,”340 establishes legal liability for and  “human rights violation or abuse”341 
which is defined as “any harm committed by a State or a business enterprise, 
through acts or omissions in the context of business activities.”342 What constitutes 
“harm” in this context will be the key question.343 There is major opposition to the 
treaty among influential states and it is not clear, at this stage, that the final version 
will be widely ratified.344  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has been critical of the current human rights responses to the 
marketization of housing markets. However, it is ultimately hopeful that human 
rights law and argumentation can address the subject. It has identified that the 
content of the right to housing, the nature of state obligations under the ICESCR, 
and of business responsibilities under the UNGPs each apply to the subject. The 
CESCR has the basic tools, but it is submitted that it needs to clarify specific 
standards that can create clear violations, and clear compliance, around the right. 
Clear standards can be set around issues such as retrogressing affordability, and 
clear law and policy changes can be recommended to address the issue. 
Commodification breeds profit-motivated exploitation. Failure to address 
commodification leaves housing at the mercy global finance and causes 
demonstrable human rights impacts. This is a serious problem for human rights, 
and one that has been overlooked for too long. There is plenty of evidence of a 
nascent turn toward the subject among academics and others, and this paper can, it 
is hoped, contribute to the development of oppositional strategies within the human 
rights movement. 
Regarding next steps, it would be useful for the UNSR on the right to 
housing to develop a report for use by the CESCR to clarify some global, regional 
and national standards around what constitutes “clear violation” in relation to 
affordability, eviction rates, homelessness, and in regard to permitted business 
practices. The report should also include reasonable standards for progressive 
realization within a single reporting period along these metrics, and possible policy 
options to achieve these improvements. It may be useful to initiate this strategy 
within a country report first, to allow sufficient attention to empirical detail. As 
noted, this could bring the CESCR’s practice more in-line with the UNSR’s 
approach to national housing strategies, particularly, the principles “to prioritize 
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those most in need and ensure equality,”345 of “human rights-based goals and 
timelines,”346 “accountability and monitoring,”347 and concerning the “obligations 
of private actors and regulate financial, housing and real estate markets.”348 It is 
also necessary for detailed empirical work to be undertaken to provide the CESCR 
and national governments with specific, reasonable and ambitious standards within 
their jurisdiction. As identified in relation to Hong Kong, the UK, and the US, many 
organizations and experts can contribute knowledge to these standards. In so doing, 
the long-term retrogression of affordability in housing and its numerous subsequent 
effects can be described in terms of clear violations of the right to housing, states 
can be held accountable to specific standards in this regard, and recommendations 
as to specific policies conducive to meeting these standards can be elaborated. It is 
submitted that such a method may help rethink international human rights law so 
as to challenge the now egregious crisis engendered through the commodification 
of the materialities of human rights.   
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